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Abstract
The cost-minimization part of a specific factors model with perfect capital
movements and production externalities for both perfect and imperfect
competition is used here to explain the growth rate of wages as a function of
technical change, terms of trade or import changes, interest rate changes and the
growth rate of the labour supply. Our estimation of the perfect competition
model for 67 combinations of countries and sectors yields the result that
technical change explains a higher percentage of both wage and employment
growth than changes in the terms of trade do before the 1980s. From the 1980s
onwards international trade is slightly more influential than technical progress.
Much more important than these two are changes in the sector specific labour
supply in all countries but the UK. In the UK terms of trade changes matter
most. However, since we cannot exclude increasing returns, a model with imper-
fect competition is also estimated. Results support those from perfect
competition. Ultimately, as compared to other literature, we identify some more
sectors that seem to have been negatively affected by international trade. Finally,
we consider policy conclusions.
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11. Introduction
Sectoral wages are the average of the wages for skilled and unskilled labour.
Explaining their development has recently led to some controversies (see Freeman
1995). The major problems discussed are why do wages for skilled and unskilled
labour diverge in the US and why has unemployment been heavily concentrated on
low-skilled workers in Europe? These shifts can also be observed in Newly
Industrialized Countries (NICs) (see Richardson 1995). The wage determination
question, however, is of broader interest.
Many economists using closed or open economy growth models would explain wage
growth mainly as a consequence of technical progress. Labour market economists
would tend to emphasize (sectoral) supply and demand with little weight on
international aspects (see Richardson 1995). Trade economists would tend to ignore the
supply of labour when using the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. However, in a
multisectoral world of international trade and capital movements it is tempting to take
a broader perspective. Consequently, one may ask the question what the relative
importance of the major determinants of (average) wage growth and employment -
international trade or factor movements, technological change or labour market
developments- are once one integrates all of them into one framework. In this paper we
try to answer this question with regard to the US and six European countries (where
wage inequality seemingly has changed much less than in the US). The inequality issue
will not be addressed in this paper. We analyze average wages.
Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) and Krugman (1994) have argued that international
trade would have an impact on wages, if any, via changes in the terms of trade.
However, they indicate that the terms of trade of the US are almost unchanged and
therefore changes in wages must be due to technical change. This argument leaves us
with several open issues:
i) Results may be different for other countries than just the US;
ii) Results may change if we do not argue in terms of a two-sector model but at a
more disaggregated level, because some of us will remember that in continental
Europe the shipbuilding sector did shrink in the 1970s, automobile business was
faced with increased competition from Japan in the early 1980s and the European
consumer electronics sector lost grounds in the 1980s and 1990s. Ultimately,
protectionists lobby at the sectoral or even the firm level and not at the macro level;
iii) Once international capital movements are taken into account, not only the terms
of trade but also interest rates become an exogenous variable for a (model of a)
country and their changes should have an impact on wage growth according to
economic theory.
How did the literature treat these three issues? The only contribution on average
wages so far is Lawrence and Slaughter (1993). Some other insights are gained from
the wage inequality debate by:
i) Lücke (1997), who has looked at data for Germany and the UK and Oscarsson
(1997) for Sweden. Seemingly, for many other countries this has not been done
(within an international trade framework). Oliveira Martins (1994), using an
industrial economics rather than an international trade approach also looks at several
countries;
2ii) Leamer (1996), who sees the point of relevance for single sectors too, mentioning
apparel and textiles in the US. Krugman and Lawrence (1993) acknowledge that
Japan did threaten US textiles in the 1960s and semiconductors in the 1990s;
iii) Leamer (1993), who takes international capital movements into account when
making theoretical scenarios but not when running estimations. Wood (1994), as
well as Sachs and Shatz (1994), also look at several sectors and international capital
movements. However, they do not have an integrating framework but rather look at
all aspects, separately running regressions that give some intuition on their idea that
international trade, technology and international capital movements are all important.
Thus, it seems to be worthwhile to investigate all of these points more closely.
Most of the wage inequality debate in international economics has been conducted
in terms of Heckscher-Ohlin models (see Sachs and Shatz 1994, Baldwin and Cain
1997, Lücke 1997, Oscarsson 1997). Krugman and Obstfeld (1997) give a justification
for this choice: although labour may not be mobile between sectors because its skills
are specific to one sector only, reschooling could achieve the desired mobility after
some time, which would justify the mobility assumption of the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
Against this we like to propose that before reschooling, labour is specific to one (or
several) sector(s) and after reschooling it is specific to different sectors or just one. We
prefer to capture this with a specific factors model that has an exogenously changing
labour supply for each sector and allows for sectoral differences in wages, whereas the
HO model does not (see Leamer 1994). Also, most of the literature uses the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem for the analysis (see Leamer 1994, Richardson 1995, Baldwin and
Cain 1997, Lücke 1997, Oscarsson 1997), which makes the latter heavily dependent
on the empirical validity of the zero-profit conditions in every sector or period2. Using
the cost-minimization part of a specific factors model with production externalities for
perfect and imperfect competition and international capital movements can avoid this
drawback. It provides a simple way to include the supply of labour, technical change,
international trade and factor movements in one framework. Yet, it does so at the cost
of slightly exaggerating the immobility aspect of labour (which is now restricted to
merely one sector). Other alternatives to the Stolper-Samuelson approach are presented
in Francois (1996).
                    
2 .  Note that the estimation of Jones' (1970) dynamic version of the zero-profit conditions uses data on
factor shares (see Baldwin and Cain 1997), which consist of a cost term in the numerator and revenue
terms in the denominator. If we (empirically) have zero-profits on average across time, we might guess
from a business cycle perspective that there are losses in recessions and positive profits in booms. This
yields higher than average values of cost shares in recessions and lower values in booms. In time series
estimates this may bias the results, in particular in view of the possibility that capital and labour shares
may be affected unequally because of the irreversibility (or costly reversibility) of the investment of
capital which makes it difficult to reduce its cost in a recession.   
3To allow for the treatment of more sectors motivated under point ii) above we will
construct a multisectoral, specific factors model in section 2. The inclusion of interna-
tional capital movements brings in interest rate changes in accordance with the
motivation of point iii) above. In section 3, some remarks on the data and analysis
techniques are made. Section 4 contains our main findings, whereafter section 5 will
discuss the policy conclusions which may be drawn from them. Finally, section 6
addresses the limitations of our approach and gives some guidelines for further
research.
2. Model Description
The details of our model are as follows. For each product i we assume the following
production function for n identical firms to be responsible for the generation of variable
costs, where Y indicates output, K capital, L labour, A technology and Q = ΣYi is
sectoral output:
α, β and θ are elasticities of the production of capital, labour and technology. η 
indicates production externalities which can have any sign. If the sum of α and β is
smaller, larger than or equal to one, we have decreasing, increasing or constant returns
to scale at the firm level and therefore upward or downward sloping or constant cost
functions (for given technology A). We do not exclude any of these cases a priori.
From cost minimization we get (with w as the wage rate and r as the interest rate):
λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the technology constraint, whose economic interpreta-
tion is marginal costs. Lower indices K or L indicate a partial derivative with respect
to K or L. The three equations given above allow us, together with the definition for
sectoral output, Q,  to find a solution for the value of the Lagrange multiplier λ. We get
(dropping the index i) :
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4In case of perfect competition, marginal costs equal prices given from the world
market (under the small country assumption) and marginal productivity conditions can
therefore be rewritten as:
Rewriting the marginal productivity conditions in growth rates, using the Cobb-
Douglas form of production functions, and the elimination of the term for capital yields
an equation for several sectors in different countries (we do not write down a country
index):
In this model, the terms of trade are exogenous in case of perfect competition and the
small country assumption. These assumptions are made in most of the related literature.
With perfect capital movements the real interest rate, r, is given from the world market
at each moment in time. Technology is exogenous by assumption and so is labour input
because of the assumption that it is specific to each sector. Alternatively, we could have
had employment as an endogenous variable and wages as an exogenous one. Then the
equation would try to explain employment of a sector in a country3.
                    
3 .  In the standard partial equilibrium labour market diagram an increase in the labour supply would
decrease wages. However, the increase in employment has an indirect effect via the marginal productivity
of capital, which is increased by higher employment and therefore more capital is attracted from the world
market. With the increase in capital, labour demand also increases which would increase wages. Under
increasing (decreasing) returns to scale the indirect demand effect is stronger (weaker) than the direct
supply effect.
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5The right hand side of the equation above captures all variables that play a role in the
debate on real wages. International trade is captured by changes in the terms of trade,
technology is contained and international capital movements are represented by
changes in the interest rate. Finally, factor supply is included which could not be done
in a Stolper-Samuelson approach using the zero-profit assumption.
An estimate of this equation at the firm level would give us a result for α/(1-η), the
elasticity of production of capital of a sector in a country corrected for the production
externality, from either γ1 or γ2. Therefore we have to impose or test the constraint :
when doing the estimation. Having found a value for α/(1-η) we can deduct the value
of β/(1-η) from γ4 and that of θ/(1-η) from γ3. The question whether or not we have
increasing returns to scale can be answered by looking at γ4. If it is less than, more than
or equal to zero, we have decreasing, increasing or constant returns to scale in labour
and capital at the sectoral level including the production externalities. However, only
if the previous coefficient restriction is accepted we may draw such a conclusion, for
then we can suspect that the definitions of the other coefficients hold too. Moreover,
the assumption of perfect competition is only justified if we have non-increasing
returns to scale at the firm level, which means that (α+β-1) ≤ 0. It will turn out below
that the estimations yield a positive sign for the labour variable, although it can have
any sign. With non-increasing returns at the firm level this requires a positive
externality that is large enough to make the numerator positive but also leaves the
denominator positive. With the positive denominator the signs given for all γ−terms in
the previous formula follow. 
In the case of increasing returns to scale at the firm level we have to resort to
imperfect competition and endogenous prices. Therefore we must give up the small
country assumption, because price determination by domestic firms and prices given
from the world market are mutually exclusive concepts (see Helpman and Krugman
1989). If a sector is faced with a constant-elasticity demand function,
MMYB = p ineuieuii
i εδφ
, with φ as an inverse of the price elasticity, Meu as import
quantities of competing products from the EU, Mneu as their non-European equivalent,
B as a shift parameter which captures all other demand effects (such as effects of other
imports coming into the country), and each product being produced by only one firm
(as it would under monopolistic competition), profit maximization will yield
1)+/( = p iii φλ . Prices are now an endogenous variable because marginal costs (λ)
are endogenous for they depend on output and wages. A division between European
and non-European trade is made because competition from the Asian NICs has been
of special interest in the recent debate. If trade has an impact we would expect δ,ε < 0.
Equating prices from the first-order conditions with those of the demand function
yields:
1, = + 21 γγ
1)+/( = MMYB iiineuieuii φλεδφ
6Taking growth rates of this equation, the marginal productivity conditions and the
expression for λ gives us four linear equations for four endogenous variables: the
growth rates of wages (w), capital (K), marginal costs (λ) and sectoral output (Q =
nYi). The exogenous variables are the growth rates of A, B, L, r, Meu and Mneu.
Parameters are α, ß, θ, η, a, b, c, d, δ, ε and φ. Solving the system for the growth rate
of wages yields:
7In this equation, compared to that of the perfect competition case, imports are the
exogenous variable that replace prices. The exogenous shift variable B can go either
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8way. If it is decreasing, competition is increased. Then, the demand function is shifted
towards lower prices. As these coefficients are anything but easy to overlook, it is
useful to consider first the case of no externalities, η=0. In this case the numerator of
e4 becomes 1- (α+β)(φ+1) > 0, which must be positive because its negative value is
exactly equal to the second order condition of the monoplist. Therefore the
denominator with no externalities would have to be negative, leaving us with a negative
coefficient.  However, the empirics below give us mostly positive coefficients.
Therefore it is most easy to keep oversight by making the following assumptions under
which the second order conditions are not violated and the empirics can be understood.
Let us assume the sufficient conditions that η > 0, 2(α+β)−1 > 0  and (1-α-β) is
positive and sufficiently small to make the denominators of all coefficients negative.
Then the second order condition of the monopolist is not violated, e4 is negative for
sufficiently small externalities and positive for large externalities and therefore it can
have any sign. Moreover, all the terms in squared brackets in the numerators of e0-4 are
positive if (φ+1) > 0 (as required by the first order condition of the monopolist). The
expected coefficients for both import terms (e1a and e1b) and the interest rate (e2) are
non-positive and that of technical change (e3) is non-negative. e0  and e4 can have any
sign.    
 
3. Data and Econometric Methods
The estimated equations have been derived from the firms' rules for cost mini-
mization and profit maximization and then have been aggregated into sectoral
equations under the assumption of a given number of identical firms. We have data at
the sectoral level.
Having constructed a model that differs from those of standard international trade
models in textbooks by the production externality and the international capital
movements, we have to relate a non-monetary model to data that stem from a monetary
world. This requires dividing the data for wages and sectoral prices by the GDP price
level of the country in question. Moreover, nominal interest rates have to be deflated
by subtraction of the growth rate of the GDP deflator. We start from national nominal
interest rates, because in spite of our assumptions it is not clear that national capital
markets are perfect. Although we have not modelled capital market imperfections
explicitly, national rates seem to be the more adequate data.
We will test for structural breaks. The question whether employment drives wages
or wages drive employment will be 'answered' using Granger causality tests.
The regression equations will be estimated by OLS4 without the aforementioned
coefficient restrictions (at least initially). This technique is applied so that a hetero-
scedasticity-consistent covariance matrix arises5. A description of the data can be found
                    
4 .  Applying NLS or ML (while simultaneously imposing the coefficient restriction derived in the
theoretical part) would have been an option, were it not that we would then be implying that the
coefficient restriction already holds a priori. Thus, given the reservations expressed above, OLS seems
to be preferable. Pooling data (across sectors, countries or both) would have been an option too, but it
was dropped when relatively little interpretable results emerged. See also footnote 19 and 42.
5 .  White's method (1980) is used to achieve this.
9in appendix A1. At this point, only the choice of R&D expenditures as a proxy of
technical change will be elaborated upon.
Basically, there are two sets of indicators that can serve as a proxy of technical
change: R&D data and patent statistics. However, both have their drawbacks. R&D
data are an input measure of the innovation process. Not all R&D inputs lead to
innovations, and also the efficiency with which inputs are used influences the amount
of successful R&D efforts. Thus, more R&D expenditures do not necessarily imply
more innovative activities. On the other hand, patent statistics are an output measure
of the innovation process. Not all innovations are patented, and not all patents are put
to effective and/or commercial use6. Moreover, the propensity to patent differs between
countries7. In addition, neither R&D expenditures nor patent data refer exclusively to
process innovation as our model does. At least product innovations for consumers
should be excluded (but cannot). Another problem associated with using R&D statistics
as a technology indicator is that series containing labour or capital data will mostly
include, to some extent, labour and capital used as an input to R&D. Thus, adding
R&D as a separate factor in the analysis could create a sort of 'double-counting'.
However, there is mixed evidence on both the question if and how far the consequences
hereof reach. For example, while Schankerman (1981) and Hall and Mairesse (1992)
state that corrections for double-counting should be made8, Verspagen (1995) finds
only very limited effects. We will not touch upon this issue either, assuming the bias
that arises because of double counting to be negligibly small (which seems reasonable,
given that the capital variable drops out of the regression equations)9.
Nevertheless, the decision to use R&D expenditures as a proxy of technical change
was mainly motivated by data availability, which was larger for R&D data.
4. Results and Interpretations
In section 4.1 we will discuss the estimation results for the perfect competition
model, whereafter in section 4.2 the results for the imperfect competition model are
examined.
                    
6 .  Scherer (1983) and Griliches (1990) examine the points in favour and against using either R&D or
patent statistics as an indicator of technical change more closely.
7 .  Cf. Scherer (1983) and Feldman and Florida (1994). See Caniëls (1998) for European evidence
hereof.
8 .  With the estimated return to R&D being downward biased.
9 .  In appendix A1 additional remarks on this subject are made.
10
4.1 The Case of Perfect Competition
The basic regression output is shown in appendix B110. At first, a constant term is
included in the regressions to capture the mean effect of (possibly) missing variables
(like additional productive factors). We expect γ1 and γ3 to have a positive sign, γ2 to
have a negative one, whereas γ4 and γ0 (which will be used to denote the constant term)
can have either sign11. As can be seen, the constant term is (statistically) significant at
the 5% level for entire Germany, almost all of Italy (except for textiles, footwear and
leather products and the basic metals sector), whereas it is only significant for total
manufacturing and wood, cork and furniture in France, the French, British and Spanish
paper and printing industry and the Spanish chemical industry. For the Netherlands and
the US, a rather mixed picture emerges (with chemicals, total manufacturing, stone,
clay and glass and paper and printing being the significant sectors for the Netherlands
and food, drink and tobacco, basic metals, total manufacturing, wood, cork and
furniture and other manufacturing industries for the US). Reasons for this outcome may
be that labour market aspects (like changes in union power, falling real values of the
minimum wage, an upgrading of skills and compensation policies of firms), incomplete
capacity utilization, developments in the non-traded sector, or additional production
factors (like land and natural resources) are at work (which are all not present in our
model).
Many of the variables do have their expected signs to some degree, but are often not
significant, as is typical of the whole literature discussed above. An exception is the
labour variable, which is generally both positive and significant (only the British food,
drink and tobacco and other manufacturing industries have a negative coefficient). This
might point to increasing returns at the sectoral level12.
It is likely that there are structural breaks underlying the results. Such breaks may
especially stem from the movement from negative to positive real interest rates at the
beginning of the 1980s13. For Great-Britain, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, such
a change in sign occurs in 1981. In France it occurs in 1980, whereas in Spain and the
US, a change in sign of the real interest rate takes place in 1976 and 1986 respectively.
Moreover, the high dollar value of 1985 may have induced another structural break. To
test for these notions, a Chow break test14 is applied to both the aforementioned year
                    
10 .  Three sectors were excluded because of missing R&D data: the Dutch and Italian wood, cork and
furniture sectors and the Dutch other manufacturing industries.
11 .  The sign of γ4 depends on the presence of increasing returns to capital and labour at the sectoral
level, cf. section 2. The fact that it can take on either sign is illustrated by Efendioglu and Von
Tunzelmann (1998) and Spiezia and Vivarelli (1998).
12 .  An alternative interpretation that is somewhat independent of our model could be that the economy
is moving along an upward sloping labour supply curve - a view found in the work of Bovenberg (see
Bovenberg 1995 for details).
13 .  From a model point of view, the period characterized by positive real interest rates is the only one
of interest, because only then the model holds. It is assumed however that when no structural breaks are
found, the influence of negative real interest rates on the regression results is negligibly small.
14 .  See Chow (1960) for details.
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of the sign change of the real interest rate and the dollar value15. The results hereof are
also given in appendix B1.
Only a limited number of breaks is found. They arise for total manufacturing and
wood, cork and furniture in France, the chemical industry in France and the UK,
fabricated metals products in France and Italy, leather products in Italy and the UK and
the German other manufacturing industries. Of these sectors, three seem to have been
affected by the dollar value of the mid 1980s: total manufacturing in France and the
two British sectors16. It is decided to let the estimation period for all the aforementioned
sectors start in either 1980, 1981 or 1986 instead of (mostly) 1974 and to redo the
estimation. The results of this estimation process (taking into account structural breaks)
are depicted in appendix B2.
Given that we only found structural breaks for nine sectors, it does not come as a
surprise that, although there are changes to be seen (for example, a wrong change in
sign in the price variable for fabricated metals products in France and a correct one for
the interest variable of the same sector in Italy), the overall results are not very different
from those of appendix B1. Thus, structural breaks do not seem to be at the heart of the
unexpected signs and large sizes of some of the variables in our model. Factors that
remain are the significance of the constant term (in some equations) and the fact that
we have not yet imposed the coefficient restriction derived in the theoretical part. If we
leave out the constant term for those sectors for which it is statistically insignificant at
the 5% level and then test whether the proposed restriction is in place, we obtain the
results of appendix B317.
The omission of the constant term alters our results somewhat (leading, among
others, to several smaller (yet more significant) values of the labour variable)18, but the
overall results are quite similar to the ones already reached in appendix B2. Besides,
we see that at the 5% significance level, the coefficient restriction can be accepted only
twice. We find significant results for the British chemical industry and Dutch fabricated
metal products. Only for these sectors we may, if we get plausible estimates for α/(1−η)
and ß/(1−η), say something about the presence of increasing returns. We can do so by
checking whether (α+β)/(1−η)−1 ≤ or > 0, holds. It is unlikely that plausible estimates
                    
15 .  It is reckoned that econometrically more sophisticated methods exist to assess points in time at
which structural breaks occur (see for example Gallant and Fuller 1973). However, we concentrate on
the years which we assume to be the most influential.
16 .  The British chemical industry is also affected by the sign switch of the real interest rate at the
beginning of the 1980s.
17 .  All regressions were also carried out with a time variable included. This variable was always
insignificantly different from zero at a 5% significance level (which is not that surprising since we are
working with series expressed in first differences).
18 .  The technology variable now has the desired sign more often and (especially) becomes more
significant. This might point to the fact that R&D expenditures are rather flawed an indicator of technical
change. However, putting the technology variable into the residual would then again seem too drastic an
action for it would, in a statistical sense, lead to omitted variable bias.
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arise for both these sectors, because not all coefficients have the expected sign: for
example, for fabricated metals products in the Netherlands, the interest variable turns
up with a positive coefficient. In fact, inferring values for α/(1−η), ß/(1−η) and θ/(1−η)
does lead to estimates for these two sectors (α/(1−η) equals either -.010 or .019,
ß/(1−η) -.083 or 1.71 and θ/(1−η) -.011 or .430)19. Negative values indicate η > 1,
which may seem to be somewhat implausibly high. Together with the theoretical part
this may indicate the presence of an aggregation problem (or omitted variables).
Of all variables, labour is for a large part significantly different from zero, whereas
especially for the price and interest variables, there are many unexpected entries as far
as sign and significance are concerned. However, statements about increasing or
decreasing returns to scale cannot be made anymore since the restriction that would
give rise to such an outcome is not accepted.  It can only be said that a significant and
mostly positive relationship exists between sectoral wage growth and employment
growth in almost all sectors and countries under consideration20. One might suggest
that specific factors matter, although the less plausible results for the other variables
possibly overstates the importance of such a conclusion.
The question remains in what direction the relationship between employment and
wages holds. Do wages determine employment or does employment determine wages
instead? Tentatively, this question will be 'answered' by means of Granger causality
tests.
Granger causality tests21 examine whether the occurrence of a certain event (variable)
X precedes the occurrence of another event (variable) Y over a certain period of time.
Stated differently, it is tested whether variable Y is temporally dependent upon variable
X. Thus, it is not causality in a strict sense that is analyzed here: it is the order in which
events happen that matters22. Besides, Granger causality is like a two-way street: only
when X Granger causes Y, and Y does not (at the same time) Granger cause X, we may
say that there is temporal dependence of Y upon X. More specifically, the following
model is estimated:
                    
19 .  If all coefficient definitions given in the theoretical part are substituted into the regression equation
and the model is re-estimated by means of NLS, these α/(1−η), ß/(1−η) and θ/(1−η) estimates follow.
Of course, it would have been preferable to solve the system numerically. This did not yield any result,
for then it is implicitly assumed that the imposed coefficient restriction holds exactly, whereas our test
examines whether it holds within a certain margin.
20 .  Exceptions (with respect to significance) are all British sectors except textiles, footwear and leather
products, stone, clay and glass, paper and printing and wood, cork and furniture, the French food, drink
and tobacco, stone, clay and glass and other manufacturing industries, food, drink and tobacco in the
Netherlands and Spain and the Dutch basic metals sector.
21 .  First introduced by Granger (1969). Sims (1972) and others provided tests (mostly) along the same
lines, but the Granger causality test is the one most commonly used.
22 .  See Eels (1991) for a more elaborate analysis hereof.
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where p,q = predetermined lag orders;
εt = random disturbance term.
The null hypothesis that X does not Granger cause Y is that ßq = 0 ∀ q (while
simultaneously, Y should not Granger cause X: αp = 0 ∀ p). The size of p and q is
mostly agreed upon a priori on theoretical grounds. Here, we will assume, letting Yt
denote sectoral wage growth and Xt the corresponding growth of labour, that p and q
range from one to three. Tests were carried out with both one and two lags, but this did
not alter our basic results very much23. Results are presented in appendix B4.
Employment Granger causes wage growth in a limited number of cases: only for the
British fabricated metal products and food, drink and tobacco significant results are
found (at a 5% level of significance). However, wages determine employment growth
more often: for three British sectors (chemicals, textiles, footwear and leather products
and basic metals) this turns out to be the case. Two other significant results emerge,
namely for Spanish leather products and the Italian paper and printing industry. For
wood, cork and furniture in Germany and total manufacturing in Great-Britain, there
are statistically significant relationships in both directions: wages determine
employment and by the same token, employment determines wages. Nevertheless, the
conclusion in these cases is the same as for all sectors not mentioned: the Granger
causality test is inconclusive.
It is quite interesting that when significant results are found, they occur most often
for Great-Britain. There seems to be no apparent reason for this outcome though.
In the 5 cases where wages Granger cause employment growth, the estimation is
redone, with wage growth now being an explanatory variable and labour growth the
dependent one. As far as the value of the coefficients is concerned, this simply means
rewriting the equations already shown in appendix B324. However, the fit does change,
as does the significance of the coefficients. Tests for structural breaks have to be redone
too. Also in the first stage, a constant term is included in the regression equation. For
the sectors for which it does not differ significantly from zero at the 5% level of signifi-
                    
23 .  Do note that it is short-run causality that we test for here. If we would have wanted to detect long-
run causality, the existence of a cointegration equation between labour and wage growth should have
been proven. Given that we found no evidence hereof when doing so (possibly because of the somewhat
limited number of observations available) the current approach is chosen.
24 .  Note that it is not necessary to test the validity of the derived coefficient restriction again because
of the same reason (as long as the estimation period remains the same). Here, we have to perform this test
anew for two sectors: chemicals and leather products in the UK. For the latter sector, the coefficient
restriction is accepted, so new estimates for α/(1−η), ß/(1−η) and θ/(1−η) can be generated. See also
footnote 27.
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, it is dropped and the modified model is re-estimated. These 'final' regressions
are given in appendix B4.
Note that the desired sign of the explanatory variables switches when moving from
wage growth to labour growth as the dependent variable. Only for the relationship
between wages and labour it remains the same. Even then, there are many wrong signs
to be found26. The interest variable does not have the correct sign for any sector. The
technology variable has the wrong sign for three sectors: chemicals in the UK and
textiles, footwear and leather products in both the UK and Spain. The price variable has
the wrong sign for the two non-British sectors. Thus there is no sector for which all
variables have the desired sign. Therefore, no new insights on coefficients are created
here either27. However, below we will report on all reversed causality cases
independent of the outcome of the Granger causality analyses.
For those sectors where all coefficients have the expected sign28, it might be
illuminating to examine how far the explanatory variables attribute to the explanation
(of variation in) the dependent variable29. This means conducting a sort of 'growth
accounting' exercise.
                    
25 .  As turned out to be the case for British and Spanish textiles, footwear and leather products and the
Italian paper and printing industry.
26 .  Which is not surprising since coefficients that already had the wrong sign when wages were taken
as the dependent variable, will have so now too (as long as the constant term remains either absent or
present and the estimation period remains the same).
27 .  This is the reason why we find no reasonable estimates for α/(1−η), ß/(1−η), θ/(1−η) in case of
leather products in the UK (where we did accept the coefficient restriction): α/(1−η) equals 2.93⋅10-3,
ß/(1−η) 1.50 and θ/(1−η) -.128. See also footnote 24.
28 .  At first, we will only look at cases where employment determines wage growth. If we had reversed
the position of the wage and labour variables in the regression equation and redone the entire analysis
up to this point, we would have ended up with 10 sectors to work with (instead of the 17 we have now),
cf. table 4.5 below. Compared to the 17 sectors we find here (see table 4.1), we have an overlap for 5
sectors: three American (chemicals, basic metals and wood, cork and furniture), one French (chemicals)
and a British one (paper and printing). So if we include both relationships (where labour growth
determines wage growth and vice versa), we would have 22 sectors to continue with. Later we will
consider the other 5.
29 .  Ideally, we would have preferred looking at variables that have both the expected sign and are
statistically significant. However, this is not the case for any sector (as in all of the international trade
literature). Since we do want to give an indication whether either terms of trade or technology drives
wage growth most, the present approach is opted for.
15
From appendix B3 we see that there are 17 sectors for which we found the expected
signs. None of them is located in Germany. All sectors are shown in table 4.1. Except
for chemicals, most industries in the table are the more traditional ones.
Table 4.1 Sectors with correct expected signs.
Country Sector
USA Chemicals
Basic metals
Paper and printing
Wood, cork and furniture
France Chemicals
Stone, clay and glass
Wood, cork and furniture
Great-Britain Chemicals
Food, drink and tobacco
Paper and printing
Other manufacturing industries
Netherlands Total manufacturing
Italy Textiles, footwear and leather
Spain Basic metals
Food, drink and tobacco
Total manufacturing
Wood, cork and furniture
The basic procedure we follow for the 17 sectors where all variables have the
expected signs is to take the regression coefficients of appendix B3 and to pre-multiply
them by the means of the corresponding explanatory variables (calculated as an average
of the entire estimation period)30. Then, this figure is divided by the mean of the
dependent variable over the same period and multiplied by 100 to arrive at percentages.
Finally, to obtain country figures, unweighted means of these percentages are taken for
all sectors in table 4.1 within a certain country.
If we leave out total manufacturing31, and check the relative importance of all
variables in explaining wage growth in a certain country in the way described above,
we reach the results presented in table 4.2. For Italy and the Netherlands no results at
the country level are calculated because of the relevance of just one sector.
                    
30 .  Alternatively, we could have taken medians or calculated an average based on just the first and last
period. However, given the way in which the OLS estimates are obtained, calculating means over the
entire estimation period is to be preferred.
31 .  For it is an aggregate across all other sectors and including it would create a bias.
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Table 4.2 Relative importance of explanatory variables in explaining per country
wage growth (in percentages)32.
VARIABLE Constant (%) Technology
(%)
Capital (%) Trade (%) Labour (%) Residual (%)
COUNTRY
USA 19.7 16.9 -3.1 -3.5 57.5 12.3
France 0.0 28.8 30.9 -3.0 79.7 -36.4
Great-Britain 40.7 23.8 -18.3 31.8 16.6 5.4
Spain 0.0 22.5 19.8 -6.7 55.8 8.7
Perhaps the first impression table 4.2 gives rise to, is that a large part of the
explanation of wage growth is attributed to both the constant term (in the UK) and the
residual (in France). This implies that for these countries a significant part of wage
behaviour is not captured by our model as discussed above33.
However, it does not mean that we cannot draw any conclusion from the table (at
least, preliminary). It is evident that for most countries, a large part of wage growth is
determined by employment growth: labour supply is a dominating factor in 3 countries
(all but the UK). In the UK, a substantial part is contributed by terms of trade
changes34. The UK is also the only country where terms of trade are more influential
than technology. Looking at the overall results, we may conclude that technology is a
more important factor than trade in determining (national) wages in 3 countries. Labour
supply is an even more important factor. Again, specific factors seem to matter. This
raises the question what we can see at the sectoral level35.
                    
32 .  In regressions without a constant term the residuals do not necessarily have to sum to zero.
Therefore, a certain weight is assigned to them in these cases.
33 .  Which was to be expected, given our previous results.
34 .  Leaving aside the constant term.
35 .  A similar exercise was carried out for the period starting (mostly) from 1980 or 1981 onwards.
There, we looked at sectors which had (by and large) falling growth rates of wages. With the same
regression coefficients (which, in a rough sense, is a valid approach for structural breaks have already
been taken into account), we found results that were almost identical to the ones obtained in table 4.2.
However, the results for total manufacturing in the Netherlands and food, drink and tobacco in Spain
became worse, with respectively -123.9% and -325.1% of wage growth now being attributed to the
residual. On the contrary, we found improved results for France, where technology now emerged as the
most prominent factor in wage determination. Moreover, in Spain capital became the most important
explanatory factor. Yet overall, labour still turned out to be the most influential factor in national wage
formation. More results at the sectoral level are discussed (and shown) later on. A similar approach will
be followed in case of imperfect competiton.
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We can derive from table 4.3a below36 for the whole period under consideration (and
from table 4.3b for the 1980s onwards -the results of which we will indicate between
brackets-) that 12 (12) out of the 17 sectors included in the 'growth accounting' exercise
have negative terms of trade growth, indicating that there may be an international
problem. In 7 (7) sectors we have falling and in 10 (10) we have increasing wages
(according to the last column). In only 4 (4) sectors R&D expenditures have a negative
growth rate. R&D therefore has a positive effect on wages in both periods. Interest rates
have risen in 10 (10) sectors and therefore have decreased wage growth37. With 3 (3)
exceptions labour supply has fallen and therefore -given the positive sign of the
correlation- decreased wage growth38.
                    
36 .  Of course, the same data can also be found in appendix A2.
37 .  The extremely high value for the mean growth rate of the Spanish interest rate is due to an outlier
in 1986. Possibly, this outlier is caused by the alliance of Spain to the EU (and it was therefore explicitly
taken along in our exercise).
38 .  In 7 (7) cases the growth rates of L and w have opposite signs, but have positive regression
coefficients. The inclusion of other explanatory variables and interaction effects between them play an
important role in this 'switch' in sign.
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Table 4.3a Growth rates of explanatory and dependent variables over the estima-
tion period given by SMPL.
Sector39 SMPL Technology Capital Trade Labour Wages
USAZ35 74-93 0.0455 0.3643 -0.0019 0.0063 0.0179
USAZMB 74-93 -0.0049 0.3643 0.0015 -0.0286 -0.0222
USAZOP 74-93 0.0522 0.3643 0.0052 0.0108 0.0179
USAZOW 74-93 0.0209 0.3643 -0.0056 0.0000 0.0046
FRAZOG 74-91 0.0215 0.5437 0.0010 -0.0244 -0.0037
FRAZ35 80-91 0.0458 -0.2758 -0.0079 -0.0060 0.0030
FRAZOW 80-91 0.0779 -0.2758 -0.0051 -0.0235 -0.0082
GBRZLF 74-92 -0.0886 0.2590 -0.0047 -0.0212 0.0046
GBRZOO 74-92 -0.0019 0.2590 0.0359 -0.0253 0.0209
GBRZOP 74-92 -0.0022 0.2590 0.0060 -0.0101 0.0107
GBRZ35 86-92 0.0692 0.4908 -0.0210 -0.0070 0.0264
NLDZMT 74-93 0.0187 -0.2920 -0.0095 -0.0123 0.0028
ESPZMB 80-91 0.0173 -9.5446 -0.0339 -0.0399 -0.0323
ESPZMT 80-91 0.1139 -9.5446 -0.0089 -0.0138 -0.0078
ESPZOW 80-91 0.5935 -9.5446 -0.0047 -0.0189 -0.0173
ESPZLF 80-91 0.1110 -9.5446 -0.0188 -0.0085 0.0092
ITAZLX 81-94 0.3001 0.1873 -0.0176 -0.0197 -0.0107
                    
39 .  See the appendix A1 for a list of the abbreviations used.
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Table 4.3b Growth rates of explanatory and dependent variables over the estima-
tion period given by SMPL - from the 1980s onwards.
Sector SMPL Technology Capital Trade Labour Wages
USAZ35 81-93 0.0508 0.1435 -0.0153 0.0037 0.0143
USAZMB 81-93 -0.0311 0.1435 -0.0244 -0.0377 -0.0371
USAZOP 81-93 0.0500 0.1435 0.0083 0.0108 0.0214
USAZOW 81-93 0.0179 0.1435 -0.0023 0.0052 0.0091
FRAZOG 80-91 0.0234 -0.2758 -0.0023 -0.0279 -0.0129
FRAZ35 80-91 0.0458 -0.2758 -0.0079 -0.0060 0.0030
FRAZOW 80-91 0.0779 -0.2758 -0.0051 -0.0235 -0.0082
GBRZLF 81-92 -0.0581 0.1612 0.0040 -0.0276 0.0052
GBRZOO 81-92 -0.0646 0.1612 0.0546 -0.0285 0.0417
GBRZOP 81-92 -0.0018 0.1612 0.0034 -0.0138 0.0153
GBRZ35 86-92 0.0692 0.4908 -0.0210 -0.0070 0.0264
NLDZMT 81-93 0.0209 0.0287 0.0030 -0.0072 0.0034
ESPZMB 81-91 0.0116 -10.2546 -0.0367 -0.0449 -0.0410
ESPZMT 81-91 0.1085 -10.2546 -0.0162 -0.0138 -0.0134
ESPZOW 81-91 0.6157 -10.2546 -0.0124 -0.0182 -0.0265
ESPZLF 81-91 0.0940 -10.2546 -0.0200 -0.0063 0.0016
ITAZLX 81-94 0.3001 0.1873 -0.0176 -0.0197 -0.0107
From table 4.4a below (and table 4.4b for the more recent period of the 1980s -the
results of which are again given between brackets-), containing a similar table as
table 4.2 but then at the sectoral level, it follows that in 4 (7) out of the 17 combination
of countries and sectors the terms of trade have a larger impact than technology. This
means that technology matters more often over the whole period but terms of trade
changes are more influential in the recent period. Out of these 4 (7) sectors, 2 (4) have
falling terms of trade. Thus at the sectoral level international trade is quite important.
These 2 sectors are located in Spain (basic metals) and the US (wood, cork and
furniture). In the 1980s more Spanish sectors have terms of trade losses but also one
additional sector in the US (basic metals). However, of the 2 (4) sectors 1 (4) have fal-
ling wages.
20
The more recent period therefore is (much) less favourable (in terms of losses) than
the whole period and the terms of trade are catching up with technology in
importance40.
                    
40 .  This conclusion is independent of the fact that the residual  sometimes explains a large part of wage
growth (for example for wood, cork and furniture in France) a large part of wage growth. Even if we had
included a constant term in the regressions for these sectors anyway (and checked whether all variables
had the correct signs), the economic interpretation of the results would have remained virtually the same.
In 11 (12) of the 17 national sectors labour has the strongest impact; in only 4 (4)
cases it is technology and in 2 (1) it is trade. In the more recent period labour has
become even more important than it already was over the entire period. When counting
variables that rank second we find 6 (6) times technology, 2 (6) times trade, 3 (2) times
labour and 6 (3) times capital movements by interest changes. The overall impression
therefore is that labour supply matters most, technology second and trade and interest
rates last (in that order), but in the more recent period terms of trade have completely
caught up with technology. All evaluations have been made without taking the constant
term or the residual into account.
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Table 4.4a Relative importance of dependent and explanatory variables in
explaining per sector wage growth (in percentages).
Sector Constant (%) Technology
(%)
Capital (%) Trade (%) Labour (%) Residual (%)
USAZ35 0.0 53.3 -2.5 -0.4 30.0 19.7
USAZMB -38.8 1.0 2.8 -0.4 135.4 0.0
USAZOP 0.0 4.7 -2.5 3.0 65.1 29.6
USAZOW 117.7 8.8 -10.0 -16.0 -0.5 0.0
FRAZOG 0.0 -72.8 86.4 -13.6 251.7 -151.7
FRAZ35 0.0 198.8 49.5 -6.4 -121.7 -20.1
FRAZOW 0.0 -10.8 -12.3 8.1 188.8 -73.7
GBRZLF 0.0 -17.7 -6.5 -5.9 107.4 22.7
GBRZOO 0.0 -0.9 -6.4 120.4 7.6 -20.8
GBRZOP 162.8 -2.0 -12.2 24.0 -72.5 0.0
GBRZ35 0.0 115.8 -48.2 -11.2 23.8 19.9
NLDZMT 422.7 64.4 8.7 -6.3 -389.5 0.0
ESPZMB 0.0 -1.6 -3.5 7.3 109.9 -12.2
ESPZMT 0.0 -67.4 -3.4 42.8 151.4 -23.4
ESPZOW 0.0 -12.5 -1.1 8.0 90.4 15.2
ESPZLF 0.0 81.5 63.9 -35.5 -32.8 23.0
ITAZLX 0.0 -5.3 3.2 4.8 109.0 -11.8
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Table 4.4b Relative importance of dependent and explanatory variables in
explaining per sector wage growth (in percentages) - from the 1980s
onwards.
Sector Constant
(%)
Technology
(%)
Capital (%) Trade (%) Labour (%) Residual (%)
USAZ35 0.0 74.4 -1.3 -4.1 21.9 9.0
USAZMB -23.2 3.7 0.7 4.1 106.5 8.2
USAZOP 0.0 3.8 -0.8 4.0 54.4 38.7
USAZOW 59.2 3.8 -2.0 -3.4 56.9 -14.5
FRAZOG 0.0 -22.8 -12.6 8.8 83.0 43.6
FRAZ35 0.0 198.8 49.5 -6.4 -121.7 -20.1
FRAZOW 0.0 -10.8 -12.3 8.1 188.8 -73.7
GBRZLF 0.0 -10.3 -3.6 4.4 124.2 -14.7
GBRZOO 0.0 -14.7 -2.0 91.8 4.3 20.6
GBRZOP 113.9 -1.2 -5.3 9.6 -69.4 52.4
GBRZ35 0.0 115.8 -48.2 -11.2 23.8 19.9
NLDZMT 353.2 60.0 -0.7 1.7 -190.3 -123.9
ESPZMB 0.0 -0.8 -2.9 6.3 97.6 -0.2
ESPZMT 0.0 -37.6 -2.1 45.6 88.7 5.4
ESPZOW 0.0 -8.5 -0.7 13.8 56.8 38.6
ESPZLF 0.0 387.6 385.6 -212.0 -136.2 -325.1
ITAZLX 0.0 -5.3 3.2 4.8 109.0 -11.8
A similar exercise can be carried out by switching the roles of wage and labour
growth in the regression equation and redoing the entire analysis up to this point41.
Then we would find 10 sectors where all variables have the expected signs (5 of which
had not been included before), as shown in table 4.5 below. Note that the majority of
the sectors (7 out of 10) is located in the US.
                    
41 .  No regression outputs or intermediate results for the reversed relationship are included in the main
text. However, they can be obtained from the authors upon request. One may claim that since wages
(which now appear as an explanatory variable) are determined endogenously, the use of instrumental
variables is advisable in order to reach more accurate regression results. Since the outcome of
instrumental variables techniques is highly dependent on the number and quality of the instruments
included in the analysis, we feel that the present approach has certain advantages. A pooling exercise was
carried out here too, finally sustaining this feeling. The fact that no definite answer could be given to the
question of the existence of a long-run relationship between wage and labour growth, makes using this
'reversed causality' equation for all sectors an interesting route to follow (to consider all possible
relationships). See also footnote 23.
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Table 4.5 Sectors with correct expected signs when the roles of labour and wages
are interchanged.
Country Sector
USA Chemicals
Fabricated metal products
Food, drink and tobacco
Textiles, footwear and leather products
Basic metals
Total manufacturing
Wood, cork and furniture
France Wood, cork and furniture
Great-Britain Paper and printing
Spain Other manufacturing industries
It is interesting to see what proportion of labour growth is explained by the other
variables, like we did before. At the national level a result can only be presented for the
US, for there is too limited an amount of sectors available for the other countries.
Table 4.6 lists the relevant statistics.
Table 4.6 Relative importance of explanatory variables in explaining per country
wage growth (in percentages).
VARIABLE Constant (%) Technology
(%)
Capital (%) Trade (%) Wages (%) Residual (%)
COUNTRY
USA 71.1 523.1 -209.9 -167.1 -3251.2 3133.9
USA (excl.
ZOW)
85.3 -9.1 -2.3 -16.4 20.1 22.5
Looking at table 4.6, the large percentages we find for all variables besides the
constant term indicate that there may be an outlier between the sectors at hand. This is
indeed the case for wood, cork and furniture. Dropping this sector yields the result that
the most important variable in determining labour growth in the US is wage growth
(leaving aside the constant term and the residual). Trade, technology and capital all
play a less important role (in that order).
Again, at the sectoral level some insights can be gained by analyzing both the periods
starting from the 1970s and the 1980s. Therefore, in table 4.7a and 4.7b the growth
rates for the variables under consideration are shown for these periods.
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Table 4.7a Growth rates of explanatory and dependent variables over the estima-
tion period given by SMPL.
Sector SMPL Technology Capital Trade Labour Wages
GBRZOP 74-92 -0.0022 0.2590 0.0060 -0.0101 0.0107
USAZ38 74-93 0.0126 0.3643 -0.0157 -0.0036 0.0062
USAZLX 74-93 0.0320 0.3643 -0.0265 -0.0199 -0.0145
USAZMB 74-93 -0.0049 0.3643 0.0015 -0.0286 -0.0222
USAZMT 74-93 0.0187 0.3643 -0.0085 -0.0045 0.0047
FRAZOW 80-91 0.0779 -0.2758 -0.0051 -0.0235 -0.0082
USAZ35 74-93 0.0455 0.3643 -0.0019 0.0063 0.0179
USAZLF 74-93 0.0294 0.3643 0.0023 -0.0020 0.0048
USAZOW 74-93 0.0209 0.3643 -0.0056 0.0000 0.0046
ESPZOO 80-91 0.5407 -9.5446 -0.0489 -0.0129 0.0017
Table 4.7b Growth rates of explanatory and dependent variables over the estima-
tion period given by SMPL - from the 1980s onwards.
Sector SMPL Technology Capital Trade Labour Wages
GBRZOP 81-92 -0.0018 0.1612 0.0034 -0.0138 0.0153
USAZ38 81-93 0.0081 0.1435 -0.0216 -0.0123 0.0001
USAZLX 81-93 0.0470 0.1435 -0.0207 -0.0197 -0.0104
USAZMB 81-93 -0.0311 0.1435 -0.0244 -0.0377 -0.0371
USAZMT 81-93 0.0158 0.1435 -0.0137 -0.0083 0.0013
FRAZOW 80-91 0.0779 -0.2758 -0.0051 -0.0235 -0.0082
USAZ35 81-93 0.0508 0.1435 -0.0153 0.0037 0.0143
USAZLF 81-93 0.0241 0.1435 0.0102 -0.0019 0.0033
USAZOW 81-93 0.0179 0.1435 -0.0023 0.0052 0.0091
ESPZOO 81-91 0.5679 -10.2546 -0.0707 -0.0107 -0.0067
A general conclusion that can be drawn when comparing the two tables is that the
period of the 1980s is less favourable in many respects: for example, more sectors
suffer from adverse terms of trade (8 instead of 7) and wage growth (4 instead of 3).
Although R&D growth is larger in the 1980s than in the 1970s for some sectors (paper
and printing in the UK, chemicals in the US and other manufacturing industries in
Spain), it mostly is smaller than in the earlier period.
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Table 4.8a Relative importance of dependent and explanatory variables in
explaining per sector labour growth (in percentages).
Sector Constant (%) Technology
(%)
Capital (%) Trade (%) Wages (%) Residual (%)
GBRZOP 112.9 -0.6 -1.6 20.1 -30.8 0.0
USAZ38 337.3 8.0 -14.7 -62.8 -167.9 0.0
USAZLX 54.9 5.1 -0.7 -22.3 63.1 0.0
USAZMB 34.5 -0.8 -1.8 0.2 67.9 0.0
USAZMT 205.8 11.6 -8.5 -9.1 -99.8 0.0
FRAZOW 0.0 8.7 3.8 -0.1 38.9 48.8
USAZ35 0.0 -120.0 5.8 1.7 256.0 -43.5
USAZLF 0.0 62.1 -0.2 1.0 -118.9 155.9
USAZOW 0.0 3184.2 -1247.8 -920.2 -19607.3 18691.2
ESPZOO 0.0 45.4 5.3 -44.5 -12.4 106.3
Table 4.8b Relative importance of dependent and explanatory variables in
explaining per sector labour growth (in percentages) - from the 1980s
onwards.
Sector Constant (%) Technology
(%)
Capital (%) Trade (%) Wages (%) Residual (%)
GBRZOP 82.6 -0.4 -0.7 8.4 -32.2 42.3
USAZ38 99.7 1.5 -1.7 -25.6 -0.7 26.9
USAZLX 55.6 7.5 -0.3 -17.7 45.6 9.2
USAZMB 26.2 -4.0 -0.5 -2.1 86.4 -6.0
USAZMT 110.7 5.2 -1.8 -7.8 -14.8 8.5
FRAZOW 0.0 8.7 3.8 -0.1 38.9 48.8
USAZ35 0.0 -229.0 3.9 23.8 349.8 -48.5
USAZLF 0.0 53.6 -0.1 4.8 -86.1 127.8
USAZOW 0.0 -11.4 2.1 1.6 163.5 -55.7
ESPZOO 0.0 57.7 6.8 -77.8 59.0 54.3
Table 4.8a (and table 4.8b for the 1980s - the results of which we will again present
between brackets) is a sectoral version of table 4.6 (but now for all countries). We can
derive that in 3 (5) of the 10 sectors terms of trade have a larger influence on labour
growth than technology. Technology thus matters more over the whole period, but
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since the 1980s the terms of trade have caught up in importance. This conclusion is in
accordance with the one we obtained above.
In 9 (8) of the sectors wages have the largest impact. Technology comes first 1 (0)
times, whereas capital and terms of trade hold the first position 0 (0) and 0 (2) times
respectively. The influence of the terms of trade on labour growth thus has grown over
time. When counting the variables that rank second, we get 5 (5) times technology, 4
(3) times trade, 1 (1) time capital movements and 0 (1) times wages. It will by now not
come as a surprise that similar results as above are reached. Wage growth is the most
dominant factor in explaining labour growth, with technology in second place, trade
third and capital last. The roles of technology and trade switch when looking at the
more recent period of the 1980s.
We already stated that the perfect competition version of our model leaves something
to be desired for increasing returns at the firm level cannot be excluded from
consideration. Yet, despite its deficiencies, it is clear that its results are quite
robust: specific factors do indeed seem to matter for wage and/or labour growth,
whereas the influence of the terms of trade on the results has risen over time (when set
against the role of technology). Nevertheless, it is equally clear that there still is a need
to analyze an imperfect competition version of the model.
4.2 The Case of Imperfect Competition
The approach that is followed in case of imperfect competition is very similar to the
one followed in the perfect competition case. We first ran OLS regressions42 on the
basic model, which -from a theoretical point of view- now already contains a constant
term. As explained in section 2 we expect e1a and e1b to have a negative sign, while e0
 and e4 can have either sign. e3 is highly likely to be positive. The results of the
estimations are shown in appendix B5.
We see that the constant term (e0) differs significantly from zero at the 5%
significance level only 19 times. These are all positive entries. Negative entries turn up
only 10 times. A similar conclusion holds with respect to the coefficients of the import
variables (e1a and e1b): the coefficient for EU-imports differs significantly from zero 5
times, which are all positive entries but two. It has the desired sign 29 times. Non-
European imports turn up significantly 9 times (of which three entries are negative),
with a total of 27 negative signs. Thus, non-European imports, including those of the
Asian NICs, (may) have a substantial impact on wage growth in some sectors. Given
the construction of e1a and e1b, they should have the same sign. This happens only 22
times (with 5 cases in which they are both negative) 43.
                    
42 .  NLS and ML regressions were also tried (with either the results from the OLS regressions or zero
as starting values), but this yielded hardly any result (convergence only occurred when running NLS
regressions from zero. If we had continued with these figures, the results presented below would remain
roughly the same).
43 .  The 'conflict' in sign between the two import variables may lead us to the conclusion that even the
current specification leaves something to be desired. Do note however, that this sign 'conflict' may be due
to multicollinearity: the two import variables have a correlation that is mostly larger than .60 (and often
exceeds .80). Although there are solutions to multicollinearity (for example, dropping one of the collinear
variables), this is not an option in the present context for it would imply an explicit change of the
theoretical model.
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Technology is significant only 5 times (of which two entries are negative), and has
a positive sign 46 times. The interest rate turns up significantly 11 times too, with seven
negative coefficients. Negative signs occur 29 times in total.
Labour again is by far the most significant variable. It turns up so 51 times this time.
All significant entries are positive ones; negative entries occur only 4 times.
As compared to the results presented in appendix B1, it is striking that for many
sectors the fit improves: the imperfect-competition version of our model thus picks up
some factors that were (unjustly) left out at the perfect competition stage. To see
whether the fit can be improved even further, we tested if there are structural breaks
underlying the results. Thus, Chow structural break tests were applied for (mostly) the
years 1981 and 1986 and it was checked whether such breaks were indeed present44.
Structural breaks were found for 9 sectors: four British (chemicals, food, drink and
tobacco, leather products and total manufacturing), one American (basic metals), two
Italian (chemicals and fabricated metal products) and two Dutch ones (basic metals and
total manufacturing). For only three of them, we also found structural breaks in the
perfect competition case45. The estimation for these sectors was redone, with the
estimation period now mostly starting in 198646. The revised regression results are
presented in appendix B6. Note that the results are split into two groups: the cases
where employment growth determines wage growth and the cases where wage growth
determines employment growth47.
Some changes occur for the aforementioned sectors. We find both correct sign
switches (for example in case of the interest variable for Italian chemicals, the
European import variable for total manufacturing in the Netherlands and its non-
European counterpart for basic metals in the US and the Netherlands), coupled with
incorrect ones - sometimes even within the same sectors (for example in case of the
interest and non-European import variable for total manufacturing in the Netherlands
and the latter variable for total manufacturing in the UK). So overall, no very new
insights on coefficients are created here either.
Nevertheless, it remains quite difficult to be more specific about the results without
actually knowing the values of the parameters α, ß, δ, ε, η, θ, φ and Bˆ . This would be
                    
44 .  Why these years were chosen has been set out in section 4.1.
45 .  These sectors are the British chemical and leather products industries and fabricated metal products
in Italy.
46 .  Exceptions are the British food, drink and tobacco sector and the Italian chemical and Dutch basic
metal industries. For these sectors the estimation period started in 1981 instead of 1986.
47 .  The results of Granger causality tests in appendix B4 are still valid. For the sectors where we found
structural breaks, this implies that in two British cases (chemicals and leather products) labour is taken
as the independent variable and wages as an explanatory one, and the entire estimation procedure has to
be redone (including testing for structural breaks). So in effect, the structural break tests that were carried
out change the results for only seven sectors instead of nine.
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possible if we could solve the system of equations we get for e0-4 numerically. We then
start with a system of six equations for eight unknowns, which only can be solved if we
could take some variables together in a handy way. We found no way of doing so.
Therefore, the only thing we can do is to perform another ‘growth accounting’ exercise
using the estimates of appendix B6. First however, we have to determine which sectors
should be included in such an exercise.
 We may recall from section 2 that there are several conditions which have to hold in
order to fulfill the requirements of the model. Most of them are about (combinations
of) single parameters (like η > 0 and 2(α+β)-1 > 0), which cannot be checked so
easily. By looking at the coefficients of the two import variables (e1a and e1b) however,
we can indirectly see whether δ,ε < 0. If we take the 62 sectors for which labour growth
explains wage growth, we find negative coefficients for e1a and e1b on only 5 occasions
(cf. appendix B6). Furthermore, we can impose certain constraints on the parameter
values so that e3 is non-negative, e2 is non-positive and e0    and e4 can take on any value
(cf. section 2). Of the 5 sectors we got when checking the sign of the import variables,
we then have three sectors left: total manufacturing in the US, fabricated metals
products in the Netherlands and food, drink and tobacco in Spain. For these three
sectors a similar 'growth accounting' exercise as in the previous section can be
conducted. No such exercise will be conducted at the national level, since we have too
little observations available within each country to do so.
Growth rates at the sectoral level are presented in table 4.9a (for the whole period)
and 4.9b (for the period starting from the 1980s). Again, they yield the same conclusion
reached in the perfect competition case: the period of the 1980s is less favourable in
many respects. Most variables have smaller growth rates in the later period (except for
fabricated metal products in the Netherlands, where 5 out of the 6 variables have larger
growth rates).
Table 4.9a Growth rates of explanatory and dependent variables over the estima-
tion period given by SMPL.
Sector SMPL Technology Capital EU trade Non-EU
trade
Labour Wages
USAZMT 74-92 0.0227 0.3942 0.0434 0.0671 -0.0047 0.0041
NLDZ38 74-92 0.0153 -0.2976 0.0354 0.0677 -0.0099 0.0037
ESPZLF 80-91 0.1110 -9.5446 0.1244 0.0275 -0.0085 0.0092
Table 4.9b Growth rates of explanatory and dependent variables over the estima-
tion period given by SMPL - from the 1980s onwards.
Sector SMPL Technology Capital EU trade Non-EU
trade
Labour Wages
USAZMT 81-92 0.0218 0.1724 0.0395 0.0551 -0.0090 0.0001
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NLDZ38 81-92 0.0177 0.0464 0.0440 0.0778 -0.0061 0.0033
ESPZLF 81-91 0.0940 -10.2546 0.1363 0.0556 -0.0063 0.0016
The final growth accounting results for both periods are given in table 4.10a and
4.10b. What we see (indicating the results for the 1980s between brackets), is that wage
growth is dominated by labour growth in all but one sector (food, drink and tobacco in
Spain in both periods). There, EU-trade (non-EU trade) is the most important. In
answering the question whether technology or trade (EU and non-EU) drives wage
growth most, we find 1 (1) times technology and 2 (2) times trade. When looking at
variables that rank in second place, we find 1 (1) time technology, 1 (2) times trade and
1 (0) times capital movements. Overall, the importance of technology seems to have
been rather steady over time, the influence of trade has increased slightly whereas
labour matters most here too. Again, the constant term and the residual have not been
taken into consideration.
Table 4.10a Relative importance of dependent and explanatory variables in
explaining per sector wage growth (in percentages).
Sector SMPL Constant
(%)
Technology
(%)
Capital
(%)
EU trade
(%)
Non-EU
trade (%)
Labour
(%)
Residual
(%)
USAZMT 74-92 200.5 50.2 -14.6 -13.7 -9.8 -112.7 0.0
NLDZ38 74-92 544.7 19.8 21.0 -74.4 -116.5 -294.6 0.0
ESPZLF 80-91 125.5 64.3 99.8 -99.9 -66.8 -22.9 0.0
Table 4.10b Relative importance of dependent and explanatory variables in
explaining per sector wage growth (in percentages) - from the 1980s
onwards.
Sector SMPL Constant
(%)
Technology
(%)
Capital
(%)
EU
trade
(%)
Non-EU
trade (%)
Labour
(%)
Residual
(%)
USAZMT 81-92 9514.0 2287.5 -302.2 -589.7 -384.0 -1022-
6.1
-199.5
NLDZ38 81-92 625.4 26.3 -3.8 -106.0 -153.6 -206.5 -81.8
ESPZLF 81-91 705.2 306.1 602.7 -614.8 -760.5 -95.3 -43.3
The results for the 5 sectors for which the role of labour and wages has been
interchanged on the basis of Granger causality tests do not change the conclusions
reached above. No sector fulfills all the previous requirements. Although the small
number of sectors for which all requirements are met may cast some doubt on the
validity of our entire model, we should not forget the fact that we are still -and always
will be- faced with an aggregation problem from the assumption of identical firms
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within one sector which clearly can have distorted our results (even if the model were
correct in itself).
Yet, altering the role of wage and labour growth in all equations may be an
interesting route to follow for in that way we can check the robustness of some of the
conclusions reached previously48. In doing so, we find expected signs of the parameters
for 8 sectors: fabricated metal products in the US, the UK and the Netherlands, food,
drink and tobacco in Spain and the US, total manufacturing in the US, chemicals in
Italy and stone, clay and glass in Spain. We will perform another 'growth accounting'
exercise for these sectors. Table 4.11a and 4.11b list the relevant growth rates.
Table 4.11a Growth rates of explanatory and dependent variables over the estima-
tion period given by SMPL.
Sector SMPL Technology Capital EU trade Non-EU
trade
Labour Wages
USAZ38 74-92 0.0193 0.3942 0.0531 0.0850 -0.0031 0.0063
USAZLF 74-92 0.0339 0.3942 0.0172 0.0053 -0.0026 0.0040
USAZMT 74-92 0.0227 0.3942 0.0434 0.0671 -0.0047 0.0041
GBRZ38 86-92 -0.0537 0.4908 0.0241 0.0315 -0.0150 -0.0024
ITAZ35 74-92 0.0520 0.6333 0.0442 0.0773 -0.0018 0.0156
NLDZ38 74-92 0.0153 -0.2976 0.0354 0.0677 -0.0099 0.0037
ESPZLF 80-92 0.1110 -9.5446 0.1244 0.0275 -0.0085 0.0092
ESPZOG 80-92 0.0470 -9.5446 0.0675 0.1094 -0.0221 -0.0159
Table 4.11b Growth rates of explanatory and dependent variables over the estima-
tion period given by SMPL - from the 1980s onwards.
Sector SMPL Technology Capital EU trade Non-EU
trade
Labour Wages
USAZ38 81-92 0.0183 0.1724 0.0461 0.0799 -0.0121 -0.0003
USAZLF 81-92 0.0308 0.1724 0.0118 -0.0011 -0.0028 0.0020
USAZMT 81-92 0.0218 0.1724 0.0395 0.0551 -0.0090 0.0001
GBRZ38 86-92 -0.0537 0.4908 0.0241 0.0315 -0.0150 -0.0024
ITAZ35 80-92 0.0487 0.2304 0.0003 -0.0164 -0.0066 0.0108
NLDZ38 80-92 0.0177 0.0464 0.0440 0.0778 -0.0061 0.0033
                    
48 .  No intermediate results will be shown here either, but they are available from one of the authors
upon request. See also footnotes 35 and 41.
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ESPZLF 81-91 0.0940 -10.2546 0.1363 0.0556 -0.0063 0.0016
ESPZOG 81-91 0.0341 -10.2546 0.0728 0.1121 -0.0219 -0.0200
From the above growth rates we can derive that for the 8 sectors included the recent
period of the 1980s is less favourable for most variables: they have smaller growth rates
more often than over the entire period (with the exception perhaps of the two trade
variables). Especially the mean wage growth rate has fallen for all sectors except
fabricated metal products in the UK in the last period (where we considered the same
sample period). Thus we can reinforce the conclusions already made before. This raises
the question what we find when analyzing the impact of all variables on wage growth
(in percentages). Table 4.12a and 4.12b give an indication hereof.
Table 4.12a Relative importance of dependent and explanatory variables in
explaining per sector labour growth (in percentages).
Sector SMPL Constant
(%)
Technology
(%)
Capital
(%)
EU
trade
(%)
Non-EU
trade (%)
Wages
(%)
Residual
(%)
USAZ38 74-92 480.2 114.4 -44.4 -54.4 -215.9 -179.9 0.0
USAZLF 74-92 136.1 66.7 -6.5 -28.6 -7.6 -60.1 0.0
USAZMT 74-92 264.4 52.0 -20.3 -28.0 -101.0 -67.1 0.0
GBRZ38 86-92 663.5 -407.5 -102.1 -27.3 -34.4 7.9 0.0
ITAZ35 74-92 499.7 124.4 -6.5 -1.6 -46.3 -469.8 0.0
NLDZ38 74-92 164.5 3.9 6.5 -35.6 -14.9 -24.4 0.0
ESPZLF 80-92 262.9 79.5 62.5 -191.7 -35.4 -77.8 0.0
ESPZOG 80-92 63.6 16.9 15.3 -62.3 -0.3 66.8 0.0
Table 4.12b Relative importance of dependent and explanatory variables in
explaining per sector labour growth (in percentages) - from the 1980s
onwards.
Sector SMPL Constant
(%)
Technology
(%)
Capital
(%)
EU
trade
(%)
Non-EU
trade (%)
Wages
(%)
Residual
(%)
USAZ38 81-92 121.9 27.5 -4.9 -12.0 -51.5 2.4 16.6
USAZLF 81-92 125.0 55.6 -2.6 -18.2 1.4 -27.1 -34.2
USAZMT 81-92 138.2 26.1 -4.6 -13.3 -43.4 -0.7 -2.2
GBRZ38 86-92 663.5 -407.5 -102.1 -27.3 -34.4 7.9 0.0
ITAZ35 80-92 133.8 31.2 -0.6 0.0 2.6 -87.4 20.4
NLDZ38 80-92 269.4 7.3 -1.7 -72.3 -28.0 -34.8 -40.0
ESPZLF 81-91 355.2 91.0 90.7 -283.8 -96.7 -18.7 -37.7
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ESPZOG 81-91 64.4 12.4 16.6 -68.0 -0.3 85.2 -10.4
Wage growth has the largest impact on labour growth in 2 (2) out of 8 sectors. Trade
explains a larger percentage of labour growth than technology in 5 (5) sectors. Given
that non-EU trade sometimes even exhibits the most explanatory power (in 3 (3) cases
during both periods), we may sustain the hypothesis that competition from the Asian
NICs may have had a substantial impact over the years. There are not much differences
when comparing the period of the 1970s and that of the 1980s as far as shifts in
variables and their explanatory power with regard to labour growth are concerned.
Combining the sectors we worked with above with the 22 non-overlapping sectors
we found in the perfect competition case, we have a group of 26 sectors (exclu-
ding overlap) for which either a perfect or an imperfect competition approach gives
expected signs. The evidence that can be obtained from the imperfect competition
model is that the main conclusions of the perfect competition model are endorsed.
Specific factors are important and the role of both technology and trade in explaining
wage and/or labour growth changes (with trade being influential in both periods) has
clearly come forward.
5. Policy Conclusions
Protectionism or compensation mechanisms are probably the first policy instruments
firms and sectoral institutions point to when trying to counterbalance the (financial)
effects from losses from trade. From a model point of view, the effects of such
measures are difficult to determine, for under perfect competition and the small country
assumption protectionism is damaging. However, even from a theoretical perspective
mechanisms like protectionism do seem somewhat short-sightened, for firms are not
(enough) encouraged to strengthen their international competitive position over time,
which may easily find them falling behind more and more (leading to rising
compensations from governments). Case study evidence also indicates that
protectionism may have adverse effects. For example, one policy action has been the
Trade Adjustment Assistance Program in the US. Sachs and Shatz (1994) show that
the sectoral distribution of compensations from that program are strongly correlated
with the underlying sectoral distribution of employment losses (so that losing sectors
are compensated adequately - which might make losing more attractive). Moreover, in
our analysis of both the perfect and imperfect competition cases we found a total of 9
sectors that have a negative effect from adverse terms of trade or import movements
and decreasing wages. These sectors are listed in table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Sectors that have adverse effects from trade and decreasing wage
growth.
Country Sector
USA Textiles, footwear and leather products
Basic metals
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France Stone, clay and glass
Wood, cork and furniture
Italy Textiles, footwear and leather products
Spain Basic metals
Total manufacturing
Other manufacturing industries
Wood, cork and furniture
Given the aforementioned policy measures and looking at these 9 sectors, one could
ask the crucial question whether income policies for the short run and R&D subsidies
for the long run would be a better means to help sectors coping with negative trade
effects than protectionism. As international trade has gained in importance since the
1980s this question has become more urgent for several sectors (especially for leather
products in the US and other manufacturing industries in Spain). Yet, note that one
should also study the forces playing within each of these sectors separately before
reaching a definite conclusion.
Of course, tax reductions for the less skilled or low income brackets are one variation
on income policies that would invoke a problem at the household level rather than at
the firm level.
However, it should be clear that behind the given interest rate there is a critical issue
of interest rate determination and behind the given sectoral labour supply and wages
there are labour market imperfections. Given the dominance of the labour supply
variable in both the perfect and the imperfect competition version of our model, it
seems reasonable to search for a diagnosis and a solution to trade problems in the
labour market sphere (for example by ensuring a better match between the skills
necessary to perform a certain job and the skills workers have or by loosening the
hiring and firing conditions of workers). There, specific factors have turned out to be
a robust variable that is more important than both technology and trade.
6. Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
The major drawback of a trade-theoretic approach is that international trade models
are not related to models explaining unemployment and vice versa. This is the reason
why economists currently have to choose between a closed economy labour market
imperfections approach and a trade approach. The integration of the two must be left
for further research (provided that major intertemporal changes in the labour market
situation occur). Moreover, due to the simplifying assumption of constant price
elasticities of demand and therefore of mark-ups over marginal costs, we cannot
include their change across the business cycle without considerably complicating the
model.
An incentive for further research from our analysis follows from three results. First,
in the perfect competition case the constant term in our model was absent but the
empirics tell us we should have one (thus indicating that there are possibly other
explanatory variables that should have been included in the model). Second, the model
would predict relations between the coefficients, but the corresponding constraint has
been rejected by statistical tests. Third, we could move from the firm level to the
sectoral level only under the assumption of identical firms, which in all likelihood is
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fairly unrealistic. This aggregation problem will (probably) remain even when
switching to different types of production functions with constant or variable
elasticities of substitution. Yet, even if our model and estimation results are rather
crude to give a 'robust' answer to the question what factor drives sectoral wage growth
most strongly (technology or trade), our results do have their relevance. In particular,
the supply of specific factors turned out to matter in both models (with the results being
very robust in that respect) and the changing role of international trade (becoming more
important than technology in the 1980s according to the perfect competition model) has
been clearly illustrated.
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APPENDIX A1
Data Description
All data except the Spanish, data on long-term interest rates and data on technical
change are taken from the OECD's ISDB database. Employment data contain the
number of employees, excluding the self-employed. Wages include all payments made
to wage and salary earners1, including social security payments. Both sectoral and
national prices are also calculated from the ISDB database, via value added at market
prices (with 1985 as a base year). Technically speaking, it would have been preferable
to use value added at factor costs to construct price levels for this would exclude taxes
and subsidies which may differ between countries. Only for Great-Britain value added
was available at factor costs in the database (and subsequently used). All variables are
expressed in national price levels.
Interest data are taken from the International Financial Statistics Yearbook published
by the IMF (from 1990 and 1995 publications). The long-term government bond yield
was taken as a proxy for the long-term interest rate2.
As a proxy of technical change, R&D expenditures are used3. These data are taken
from the OECD's ANBERD database.
For Spain, employment, wage and sectoral price levels are calculated from the
OECD's STAN database. Spanish employment figures do include the self-employed.
R&D data are again taken from ANBERD, whereas both national price levels (the GDP
deflator) and the interest rate data are taken from the International Financial Statistics
Yearbook. All import data (for all countries) come from the OECD's BITRA database.
The sectors included in the analysis are the 2-digit ISIC sectors 31 through 39, which
define total manufacturing (ISIC sector 30). In the remainder, we will denote these
sectors by means of an abbreviation. These abbreviations are:
                    
1 .  Which also do not include the self-employed.
2 .  As suggested by the IMF itself, cf. the International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1995 (1995),
pp. xv-xvi.
3 .  One may claim that because R&D personnel is included in the labour variable our regression results
are biased (since we are also using R&D expenditures as a separate variable). However, this only means
that there may be some collinearity between the technology and labour variable (which is justified from
a theoretical point of view). Regression results do not become biased because of collinearity. See also
section 3 of the main text.
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Table A.1.1 Sector classification and abbreviations.
ISIC code Abbreviation Sector description
30 ZMT Total manufacturing
31 ZLF Food, drink and tobacco
32 ZLX Textiles, footwear and leather
33 ZOW Wood, cork and furniture
34 ZOP Paper and printing
35 Z35 Chemicals
36 ZOG Stone, clay and glass
37 ZMB Basic metals
38 Z38 Fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment
39 ZOO Other manufacturing industries
Furthermore, the following country codes will be used from here onwards:
Table A.1.2 Country codes.
Country Country code
USA USA
Former West-Germany DEU
France FRA
Great-Britain GBR
Netherlands NLD
Italy ITA
Spain ESP
In the regression analyses three sectors were dropped because of missing R&D
data: the Dutch and Italian wood, cork and furniture sector and the Dutch other
manufacturing industries.
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APPENDIX A2
Growth Rates
Below, an overview of mean growth rates of the variables included in our model can
be found. The period over which means are taken is motivated by the estimation
periods of the 'final' regressions depicted in appendix B3. The table is divided into two
parts: first, the results for the US, Germany, France and Great-Britain are shown,
whereafter the results for the Netherlands, Spain and Italy follow.
Table A.2.1 Mean growth rates for the US, Germany, France and Great-Britain
(sample period according to appendix B3, variable definitions
according to the regression equation and appendix B1).
Sector L W P A
USAZ35 0.0063 0.0179 -0.0019 0.0455
USAZ38 -0.0036 0.0062 -0.0156 0.0126
USAZLX -0.0199 -0.0145 -0.0265 0.032
USAZOG -0.0134 -0.008 -0.0076 0.0105
USAZOP 0.0108 0.0179 0.0052 0.0522
USAZLF -0.002 0.0048 0.0023 0.0294
USAZMB -0.0286 -0.0222 0.0015 -0.0049
USAZMT -0.0045 0.0047 -0.0085 0.0187
USAZOO -0.0067 0.0018 -0.0048 0.0041
USAZOW 0 0.0046 -0.0056 0.0209
DEUZMT -0.008 0.0138 -0.0026 0.042
DEUZ35 0.0034 0.0248 0.0026 0.0308
DEUZ38 0.0018 0.026 -0.0012 0.0519
DEUZLF -0.0034 0.0099 -0.0038 0.0651
DEUZLX -0.0435 -0.0222 -0.008 0.0583
DEUZMB -0.0157 -0.0003 -0.0135 0.0026
DEUZOG -0.0178 0.0009 -0.0064 0.0684
DEUZOP -0.0031 0.0153 0.0025 0.0789
DEUZOW -0.006 0.0091 0.0086 0.4281
FRAZLF 0.0037 0.017 -0.0049 0.073
FRAZLX -0.0393 -0.0195 -0.0019 -0.0056
FRAZMB -0.0257 -0.0219 -0.0196 0.0791
FRAZOG -0.0244 -0.0037 0.001 0.0215
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Sector L W P A
FRAZOO -0.0053 0.0034 0.0008 0.0752
FRAZOP -0.0016 0.018 0.0087 0.0227
GBRZ38 -0.0244 -0.0067 -0.0073 -0.1341
GBRZLF -0.0212 0.0046 -0.0047 -0.0886
GBRZMT -0.0283 -0.0047 -0.0061 0.0127
GBRZOG -0.0333 -0.009 0.0032 -0.0369
GBRZOO -0.0253 0.0209 0.0359 -0.0019
GBRZOW -0.0152 -0.0077 -0.0007 -0.0019
GBRZOP -0.0101 0.0107 0.006 -0.0022
GBRZMB -0.0571 -0.0457 -0.0206 -0.0914
FRAZ35 -0.006 0.003 -0.0079 0.0458
FRAZ38 -0.0149 0.0004 -0.0035 0.0507
FRAZOW -0.0235 -0.0082 -0.0051 0.0779
DEUZOO -0.0216 0.0013 -0.0002 0.0243
FRAZMT -0.0095 -0.0005 -0.0007 0.044
GBRZ35 -0.007 0.0264 -0.021 0.0692
GBRZLX -0.0376 -0.0053 0 -0.0537
DEURATE1 0.0696 SMPL: 74-93
USARATE 0.3643 74-93
DEURATE2 0.0734 74-92
GBRRATE1 0.259 74-92
FRARATE1 0.5437 74-91
GBRRATE2 0.0303 74-89
FRARATE2 -0.2758 80-91
DEURATE3 0.0447 81-92
GBRRATE3 0.4908 86-92
FRARATE3 0.1147 86-91
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Table A.2.2 Mean growth rates for the Netherlands, Spain and Italy (sample period
according to appendix B3, variable definitions according to the
regression equation and appendix B1).
Sector L W P A
NLDZMT -0.0123 0.0028 -0.0095 0.0187
NLDZOP -0.0006 0.0134 -0.0064 0.0126
NLDZLF -0.0115 0.0042 -0.0099 0.0415
NLDZLX -0.0495 -0.0353 -0.0054 -0.0074
NLDZMB -0.0139 -0.0015 -0.0083 0.0234
NLDZ35 0.0026 0.0137 -0.0052 0.0223
NLDZ38 -0.0098 -0.0007 0.0007 0.019
NLDZOG -0.0135 0.0036 0.0084 0.0585
ESPZ35 -0.0184 -0.0056 -0.0019 0.0824
ESPZ38 -0.0001 -0.0026 -0.0026 0.1399
ESPZLF -0.0085 0.0092 -0.0188 0.111
ESPZLX -0.0333 -0.0361 -0.0088 0.1199
ESPZMB -0.0399 -0.0323 -0.0339 0.0173
ESPZMT -0.0138 -0.0078 -0.0089 0.1139
ESPZOG -0.0221 -0.0159 0.0005 0.047
ESPZOO -0.0129 0.0017 -0.0489 0.5407
ESPZOP 0.0099 0.023 0.0089 0.1171
ESPZOW -0.0189 -0.0173 -0.0047 0.5935
ITAZ35 -0.0051 0.0038 -0.0466 0.0545
ITAZLF -0.0121 0.0002 -0.0191 0.0967
ITAZMB -0.0369 -0.0257 -0.0519 0.0418
ITAZMT -0.0153 -0.0036 -0.0256 0.0752
ITAZOG -0.0086 0.0059 -0.0037 0.1213
ITAZOP -0.0094 0.0034 -0.0158 0.0204
ITAZOO -0.0161 0.0002 0.0044 0.2288
ITAZOW -0.0211 -0.0102 -0.0148 -0.0148
ITAZ38 -0.025 -0.01 -0.0245 0.056
ITAZLX -0.0197 -0.0107 -0.0176 0.3001
NLDRATE1 -0.292 SMPL: 74-93
ITARATE1 0.5662 74-94
ESPRATE -9.5446 80-91
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Sector
ITARATE2 0.1873 SMPL: 81-94
NLDRATE2 0.0287 81-93
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APPENDIX B1
Basic regressions/Testing for structural breaks
Regression equation is:
where, i = sector subscript;
j = country subscript;
w,p,r,A,L are defined cf. the basic perfect competition model;
ε = random disturbance term.
Sector and country classifications are defined in table A.1.1 and A.1.2 (SECTOR). The estimation period is given under SMPL. T indicates the value of the T-statistic for the null
hypothesis that γk = 0 (k = 0..4). Chow tests are carried out in (roughly) 1981 and 1985 (exact dates are given in the main text, pp. 8-9). pm denotes the p-value of the corresponding F-statistic
Fm (m = 81,85). R
2
 denotes the value of the adjusted R² statistic, whereas DW contains the value of the Durbin-Watson statistic for (first-order) serial correlation in the disturbance term
εijt. All regression equations are estimated with a heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. If an entry cannot be calculated, it is denoted by ***.
SECTOR SMPL γ0 Tγ0 γ3 Tγ3 γ2 Tγ2 γ1 Tγ1 γ4 Tγ4 R
2
         DW   F81  p81    F85  p85
DEUZ35 74-92 0.02 (3.76) 0.13 (1.82) 0.03 (2.37) 0.12 (0.70) 0.74 (3.40)  0.57   1.74   1.1  0.42  0.4  0.84
DEUZ38 74-92 0.02 (3.38) 0.02 (0.35) 0.01 (0.83) 0.19 (0.55) 1.02 (8.01)  0.66   1.29   3.0  0.07  0.3  0.88
DEUZLF 74-92 0.01 (4.80) 0.02 (1.03) 0.00 (0.36) -0.08 (1.55) 1.25 (12.66)  0.84   1.96   0.8  0.57  0.8  0.57
DEUZLX 74-92 0.02 (3.05) -0.00 (0.41) 0.01 (0.79) -0.15 (0.90) 1.01 (7.59)  0.82   1.25   0.9  0.51  0.1  1.00
DEUZMB 74-92 0.02 (3.35) -0.04 (0.63) 0.03 (2.18) 0.38 (3.61) 1.06 (3.99)  0.63   2.25   0.5  0.79  0.6  0.71
DEUZMT 74-93 0.02 (4.55) 0.08 (1.94) 0.01 (1.06) -0.22 (1.04) 1.07 (12.12)  0.78   1.40   2.8  0.08  0.2  0.94
DEUZOG 74-92 0.02 (3.41) 0.02 (0.71) 0.02 (1.01) 0.04 (0.20) 1.24 (8.17)  0.77   1.81   1.6  0.24  0.8  0.58
DEUZOO 74-92 0.03 (2.74) -0.00 (1.70) -0.01 (0.28) -0.22 (2.08) 0.98 (5.73)  0.65   1.83   5.6  0.01  0.4  0.85
DEUZOP 74-92 0.02 (3.34) 0.00 (0.17) 0.01 (0.76) 0.14 (0.88) 0.81 (4.04)  0.60   1.52   1.1  0.41  0.3  0.91
DEUZOW 74-92 0.02 (2.83) 0.00 (0.14) 0.02 (0.90) -0.14 (0.49) 1.29 (11.80)  0.73   2.44   0.7  0.66  0.4  0.83
FRAZ35 74-91 0.03 (1.73) -0.08 (0.33) -0.00 (0.53) -0.09 (0.66) 1.59 (1.64)  0.14   1.14  16.7  0.00  2.8  0.10
FRAZ38 74-91 0.02 (1.20) 0.19 (0.74) 0.00 (0.52) 0.13 (0.23) 1.43 (3.42)  0.49   1.09  12.4  0.00  2.4  0.13
FRAZLF 74-91 0.01 (1.19) 0.04 (0.37) 0.00 (1.13) -0.27 (0.50) 0.43 (0.47) -0.20   1.11   3.4  0.06  0.6  0.73
FRAZLX 74-91 0.02 (1.32) 0.01 (0.18) 0.00 (0.87) -0.22 (1.39) 1.16 (2.67)  0.29   1.50   1.6  0.28  0.3  0.90
FRAZMB 74-91 0.00 (0.02) 0.03 (0.38) 0.00 (0.93) 0.13 (0.71) 0.93 (0.94)  0.21   2.64   0.1  0.99  0.5  0.77
FRAZMT 74-91 0.01 (2.02) 0.20 (1.18) 0.00 (1.83) -0.54 (2.92) 1.30 (3.42)  0.62   1.05   9.9  0.00  5.7  0.02
FRAZOG 74-91 0.02 (1.40) 0.03 (0.32) -0.01 (3.43) 0.36 (1.81) 0.72 (3.14)  0.33   2.11   3.4  0.06  0.7  0.64
FRAZOO 74-91 0.00 (0.14) 0.01 (0.54) 0.00 (1.55) 0.04 (0.33) 0.19 (0.42) -0.19   1.76   1.3  0.36  1.9  0.19
FRAZOP 74-91 0.02 (8.09) -0.21 (4.10) -0.00 (6.29) 0.18 (2.29) 0.17 (0.90)  0.81   2.29   2.1  0.17  0.6  0.67
FRAZOW 74-91 0.02 (2.15) -0.03 (0.82) 0.00 (0.56) 0.44 (2.80) 0.71 (6.05)  0.33   1.83   4.2  0.04  0.3  0.92
GBRZ35 74-92 0.01 (1.00) 0.16 (0.82) -0.00 (0.23) 0.22 (1.10) 0.47 (2.29)  0.20   2.42   1.6  0.25  3.6  0.05
GBRZ38 74-92 0.00 (0.11) -0.01 (0.37) -0.00 (0.33) 0.17 (0.78) 0.33 (1.25) -0.00   1.64   3.1  0.07  1.7  0.24
GBRZLF 74-92 0.01 (0.34) 0.07 (0.35) -0.00 (0.17) 0.06 (0.58) -0.15 (0.42) -0.21   2.35   1.9  0.20  2.2  0.14
GBRZLX 74-92 0.04 (1.71) 0.30 (1.08) 0.00 (0.29) 0.33 (1.15) 0.67 (2.86)  0.50   2.20  11.1  0.00  4.2  0.03
GBRZMB 74-89 0.03 (0.63) 0.42 (1.01) 0.00 (0.83) 0.12 (0.74) 0.44 (1.57) -0.09   1.35   1.9  0.23  ***  ***
GBRZMT 74-92 0.02 (1.18) 0.04 (0.24) -0.00 (0.06) 0.29 (1.21) 0.67 (3.39)  0.28   2.01   2.9  0.08  2.8  0.08
GBRZOG 74-92 0.01 (1.29) 0.35 (2.85) 0.00 (0.19) 0.25 (2.22) 0.31 (1.01)  0.52   1.12   1.1  0.44  2.0  0.17
GBRZOO 74-92 -0.00 (0.27) 0.10 (1.19) -0.01 (1.41) 0.71 (4.72) -0.07 (0.56)  0.59   1.68   1.5  0.29  1.8  0.22
GBRZOP 74-92 0.02 (2.02) 0.10 (1.73) -0.01 (2.04) 0.43 (2.18) 0.77 (3.22)  0.28   1.83   0.9  0.52  0.7  0.63
GBRZOW 74-92 0.00 (0.47) 0.06 (0.81) 0.00 (0.35) 0.19 (1.41) 0.76 (5.72)  0.53   2.27   1.4  0.32  0.7  0.66
USAZ35 74-93 0.01 (1.85) 0.08 (0.94) -0.00 (2.12) 0.06 (1.01) 0.82 (6.34)  0.75   2.18   ***  ***   0.4  0.85
USAZ38 74-93 0.01 (1.73) 0.08 (1.20) -0.00 (1.19) 0.01 (0.04) 0.88 (9.02)  0.89   1.50   ***  ***   0.8  0.59
,+L+A+r+p+ = w ijtijt4ijijt3ijjt2ijijt1ij0ijijt εγγγγγ
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SECTOR SMPL γ0 Tγ0 γ3 Tγ3 γ2 Tγ2 γ1 Tγ1 γ4 Tγ4 R
2
         DW   F81  p81    F85  p85
USAZLF 74-93 0.01 (2.56) 0.02 (0.62) -0.00 (1.96) -0.11 (1.65) 0.77 (4.42)  0.60   2.16   ***  ***   0.5  0.76
USAZLX 74-93 0.01 (1.86) 0.04 (1.26) -0.00 (1.01) 0.17 (1.17) 1.11 (31.89)  0.95   1.73   ***  ***   1.2  0.37
USAZMB 74-93 0.01 (2.01) 0.04 (0.85) -0.00 (1.97) 0.06 (1.79) 1.05 (16.36)  0.92   1.69   ***  ***   1.6  0.25
USAZMT 74-93 0.01 (2.55) 0.04 (0.75) -0.00 (1.37) -0.03 (0.15) 0.94 (12.60)  0.90   2.04   ***  ***   0.3  0.88
USAZOG 74-93 0.01 (1.06) 0.04 (1.23) -0.00 (0.65) -0.01 (0.07) 1.00 (9.28)  0.88   2.52   ***  ***   0.1  1.00
USAZOO 74-93 0.01 (2.38) 0.06 (1.39) -0.00 (0.04) -0.05 (0.49) 0.94 (7.38)  0.84   2.00   ***  ***   0.3  0.91
USAZOP 74-93 0.01 (1.92) -0.02 (0.53) -0.00 (1.65) -0.01 (0.04) 1.01 (6.70)  0.69   2.08   ***  ***   0.2  0.94
USAZOW 74-93 0.01 (2.11) 0.02 (1.00) -0.00 (1.99) 0.13 (2.05) 0.99 (24.18)  0.98   2.08   ***  ***   0.4  0.87
ESPZ35 80-91 0.02 (3.21) -0.03 (3.10) 0.00 (2.67) 0.16 (3.59) 0.96 (9.00)  0.90   1.31   ***  ***   7.3  0.12
ESPZ38 80-91 -0.01 (0.59) 0.02 (0.31) 0.00 (0.03) 0.06 (0.25) 1.10 (4.34)  0.64   1.59   ***  ***  10.9  0.09
ESPZLF 80-91 0.01 (1.13) 0.06 (0.66) -0.00 (3.95) 0.25 (0.71) 0.37 (0.96) -0.02   1.55   ***  ***   1.1  0.54
ESPZLX 80-91 -0.00 (0.19) -0.05 (1.81) -0.00 (0.73) -0.02 (0.11) 0.89 (6.06)  0.72   1.90   ***  ***   2.5  0.31
ESPZMB 80-91 0.01 (0.88) 0.01 (0.40) -0.00 (1.11) 0.13 (1.18) 1.04 (4.50)  0.75   2.22   ***  ***   3.0  0.27
ESPZMT 80-91 0.01 (0.72) 0.02 (0.57) 0.00 (0.22) 0.39 (2.35) 0.90 (6.69)  0.78   1.16   ***  ***   4.4  0.20
ESPZOG 80-91 -0.00 (0.13) 0.05 (1.11) 0.00 (0.02) 0.32 (4.23) 0.79 (9.96)  0.88   2.15   ***  ***   2.7  0.29
ESPZOO 80-91 0.02 (0.60) 0.01 (1.18) 0.00 (0.52) 0.13 (0.69) 0.80 (6.32)  0.62   0.91   ***  ***   0.7  0.68
ESPZOP 80-91 0.01 (2.02) 0.01 (0.38) -0.00 (1.68) -0.05 (0.41) 0.69 (7.48)  0.85   1.55   ***  ***   1.0  0.57
ESPZOW 80-91 -0.01 (0.67) 0.01 (0.77) -0.00 (0.59) 0.32 (1.48) 0.78 (3.48)  0.73   1.50   ***  ***  15.1  0.06
ITAZ35 74-94 0.02 (2.69) 0.06 (0.93) 0.00 (0.26) 0.11 (0.95) 1.07 (6.56)  0.59   1.83   0.7  0.6   0.7  0.63
ITAZ38 74-94 0.02 (3.49) 0.01 (0.09) 0.00 (2.19) 0.39 (3.66) 1.05 (6.24)  0.78   2.25   4.4  0.02  0.9  0.49
ITAZLF 74-94 0.03 (4.66) -0.03 (1.20) 0.00 (1.44) 0.45 (2.77) 1.10 (6.82)  0.57   2.34   1.0  0.47  1.6  0.24
ITAZLX 74-94 0.01 (1.29) -0.00 (0.10) 0.00 (1.09) 0.30 (1.56) 0.76 (2.77)  0.34   2.04   9.2  0.00  0.2  0.97
ITAZMB 74-94 0.01 (1.00) -0.00 (0.06) 0.00 (0.37) 0.05 (1.07) 0.93 (2.69)  0.59   2.92   2.0  0.15  0.2  0.94
ITAZMT 74-94 0.02 (3.32) 0.04 (0.58) 0.00 (1.07) 0.44 (2.87) 1.00 (5.68)  0.66   1.87   1.4  0.31  0.5  0.74
ITAZOG 74-94 0.02 (2.25) 0.00 (0.38) 0.00 (1.65) -0.02 (0.32) 0.91 (5.46)  0.66   1.68   2.4  0.10  1.3  0.33
ITAZOO 74-94 0.02 (2.72) -0.01 (0.69) 0.01 (4.31) 0.06 (2.54) 0.96 (6.65)  0.75   2.22   1.7  0.21  0.6  0.71
ITAZOP 74-94 0.01 (2.49) 0.00 (0.09) 0.00 (3.44) -0.07 (1.16) 0.81 (7.64)  0.53   1.82   0.3  0.88  0.3  0.88
NLDZ35 81-93 0.01 (2.62) -0.07 (1.21) 0.01 (0.71) 0.08 (1.60) 1.15 (3.58)  0.53   1.82   ***  ***   ***  ***
NLDZ38 81-93 0.01 (1.57) -0.00 (0.14) 0.01 (0.53) 0.67 (4.24) 0.85 (7.48)  0.86   1.51   ***  ***   ***  ***
NLDZLF 74-93 0.01 (1.69) 0.00 (0.08) 0.00 (2.84) -0.10 (1.24) 0.71 (2.91)  0.05   1.60   0.3  0.89  1.3  0.34
NLDZLX 74-93 -0.00 (0.22) -0.02 (0.54) -0.00 (1.19) 0.28 (1.62) 0.66 (5.65)  0.73   1.78   1.8  0.20  1.1  0.42
NLDZMB 74-93 0.01 (0.95) 0.14 (2.25) 0.00 (3.93) 0.09 (1.71) 0.66 (1.91)  0.54   1.38   2.5  0.10  0.3  0.89
NLDZMT 74-93 0.01 (2.22) 0.10 (1.49) -0.00 (1.20) 0.02 (0.13) 0.89 (5.45)  0.56   1.26   1.7  0.22  0.3  0.89
NLDZOG 81-93 0.01 (2.32) -0.02 (1.29) -0.01 (0.75) 0.60 (8.57) 0.60 (7.23)  0.96   1.40   ***  ***   ***  ***
NLDZOP 74-93 0.02 (4.29) -0.01 (0.59) 0.00 (0.88) 0.10 (0.69) 1.03 (5.86)  0.72   2.00   2.0  0.1  2.7  0.08
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APPENDIX B2
Testing the significance of the constant term
Regression equation identical to appendix B1. When found to be significant, structural breaks are taken into account. All equations are estimated with a heteroscedasticity-consistent
covariance matrix. All other definitions according to appendix B1.
SECTOR SMPL γ0 Tγ0 γ3 Tγ3 γ2 Tγ2 γ1 Tγ1 γ4 Tγ4 R
2
         DW
DEUZ35 74-92 0.02 (3.76) 0.13 (1.82) 0.03 (2.37) 0.12 (0.70) 0.74 (3.40)  0.57   1.74
DEUZ38 74-92 0.02 (3.38) 0.02 (0.35) 0.01 (0.83) 0.19 (0.55) 1.02 (8.01)  0.66   1.29
DEUZLF 74-92 0.01 (4.80) 0.02 (1.03) 0.00 (0.36) -0.08 (1.55) 1.25 (12.66)  0.84   1.96
DEUZLX 74-92 0.02 (3.05) -0.00 (0.41) 0.01 (0.79) -0.15 (0.90) 1.01 (7.59)  0.82   1.25
DEUZMB 74-92 0.02 (3.35) -0.04 (0.63) 0.03 (2.18) 0.38 (3.61) 1.06 (3.99)  0.63   2.25
DEUZMT 74-93 0.02 (4.55) 0.08 (1.94) 0.01 (1.06) -0.22 (1.04) 1.07 (12.12)  0.78   1.40
DEUZOG 74-92 0.02 (3.41) 0.02 (0.71) 0.02 (1.01) 0.04 (0.20) 1.24 (8.17)  0.77   1.81
DEUZOO 81-92 0.02 (5.40) 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (1.04) -0.51 (2.77) 0.71 (5.49)  0.87   2.61
DEUZOP 74-92 0.02 (3.34) 0.00 (0.17) 0.01 (0.76) 0.14 (0.88) 0.81 (4.04)  0.60   1.52
DEUZOW 74-92 0.02 (2.83) 0.00 (0.14) 0.02 (0.90) -0.14 (0.49) 1.29 (11.80)  0.73   2.44
FRAZ35 80-91 -0.00 (0.33) 0.16 (0.96) -0.01 (3.83) 0.03 (0.28) 0.58 (2.85)  0.35   2.74
FRAZ38 80-91 -0.01 (1.80) 0.42 (3.41) -0.00 (1.05) -0.56 (3.15) 0.73 (3.96)  0.82   2.63
FRAZLF 74-91 0.01 (1.19) 0.04 (0.37) 0.00 (1.13) -0.27 (0.50) 0.43 (0.47) -0.20   1.11
FRAZLX 74-91 0.02 (1.32) 0.01 (0.18) 0.00 (0.87) -0.22 (1.39) 1.16 (2.67)  0.29   1.50
FRAZMB 74-91 0.00 (0.02) 0.03 (0.38) 0.00 (0.93) 0.13 (0.71) 0.93 (0.94)  0.21   2.64
FRAZMT 86-91 0.03 (2.10) -0.36 (1.42) 0.01 (1.05) -0.81 (7.27) 1.46 (3.01)  0.92   3.27
FRAZOG 74-91 0.02 (1.40) 0.03 (0.32) -0.01 (3.43) 0.36 (1.81) 0.72 (3.14)  0.33   2.11
FRAZOO 74-91 0.00 (0.14) 0.01 (0.54) 0.00 (1.55) 0.04 (0.33) 0.19 (0.42) -0.19   1.76
FRAZOP 74-91 0.02 (8.09) -0.21 (4.10) -0.00 (6.29) 0.18 (2.29) 0.17 (0.90)  0.81   2.29
FRAZOW 80-91 0.01 (1.57) -0.00 (0.03) -0.00 (1.90) 0.17 (1.22) 0.81 (12.31)  0.75   2.58
GBRZ35 74-92 0.01 (1.00) 0.16 (0.82) -0.00 (0.23) 0.22 (1.10) 0.47 (2.29)  0.20   2.42
GBRZ35 86-92 0.03 (1.10) 0.20 (0.91) -0.02 (4.24) 0.45 (2.53) -0.37 (0.40)  0.44   3.05
GBRZ38 74-92 0.00 (0.11) -0.01 (0.37) -0.00 (0.33) 0.17 (0.78) 0.33 (1.25) -0.00   1.64
GBRZLF 74-92 0.01 (0.34) 0.07 (0.35) -0.00 (0.17) 0.06 (0.58) -0.15 (0.42) -0.21   2.35
GBRZLX 86-92 0.00 (0.06) -0.16 (0.26) -0.02 (79.52) 1.84 (3.95) 0.17 (4.34)  0.98   0.72
GBRZMB 74-89 0.03 (0.63) 0.42 (1.01) 0.00 (0.83) 0.12 (0.74) 0.44 (1.57) -0.09   1.35
GBRZMT 74-92 0.02 (1.18) 0.04 (0.24) -0.00 (0.06) 0.29 (1.21) 0.67 (3.39)  0.28   2.01
GBRZOG 74-92 0.01 (1.29) 0.35 (2.85) 0.00 (0.19) 0.25 (2.22) 0.31 (1.01)  0.52   1.12
GBRZOO 74-92 -0.00 (0.27) 0.10 (1.19) -0.01 (1.41) 0.71 (4.72) -0.07 (0.56)  0.59   1.68
GBRZOP 74-92 0.02 (2.02) 0.10 (1.73) -0.01 (2.04) 0.43 (2.18) 0.77 (3.22)  0.28   1.83
GBRZOW 74-92 0.00 (0.47) 0.06 (0.81) 0.00 (0.35) 0.19 (1.41) 0.76 (5.72)  0.53   2.27
USAZ35 74-93 0.01 (1.85) 0.08 (0.94) -0.00 (2.12) 0.06 (1.01) 0.82 (6.34)  0.75   2.18
USAZ38 74-93 0.01 (1.73) 0.08 (1.20) -0.00 (1.19) 0.01 (0.04) 0.88 (9.02)  0.89   1.50
USAZLF 74-93 0.01 (2.56) 0.02 (0.62) -0.00 (1.96) -0.11 (1.65) 0.77 (4.42)  0.60   2.16
USAZLX 74-93 0.01 (1.86) 0.04 (1.26) -0.00 (1.01) 0.17 (1.17) 1.11 (31.89)  0.95   1.73
USAZMB 74-93 0.01 (2.01) 0.04 (0.85) -0.00 (1.97) 0.06 (1.79) 1.05 (16.36)  0.92   1.69
USAZMT 74-93 0.01 (2.55) 0.04 (0.75) -0.00 (1.37) -0.03 (0.15) 0.94 (12.60)  0.90   2.04
USAZOG 74-93 0.01 (1.06) 0.04 (1.23) -0.00 (0.65) -0.01 (0.07) 1.00 (9.28)  0.88   2.52
USAZOO 74-93 0.01 (2.38) 0.06 (1.39) -0.00 (0.04) -0.05 (0.49) 0.94 (7.38)  0.84   2.00
USAZOP 74-93 0.01 (1.92) -0.02 (0.53) -0.00 (1.65) -0.01 (0.04) 1.01 (6.70)  0.69   2.08
USAZOW 74-93 0.01 (2.11) 0.02 (1.00) -0.00 (1.99) 0.13 (2.05) 0.99 (24.18)  0.98   2.08
ESPZ35 80-91 0.02 (3.21) -0.03 (3.10) 0.00 (2.67) 0.16 (3.59) 0.96 (9.00)  0.90   1.31
ESPZ38 80-91 -0.01 (0.59) 0.02 (0.31) 0.00 (0.03) 0.06 (0.25) 1.10 (4.34)  0.64   1.59
ESPZLF 80-91 0.01 (1.13) 0.06 (0.66) -0.00 (3.95) 0.25 (0.71) 0.37 (0.96) -0.02   1.55
ESPZLX 80-91 -0.00 (0.19) -0.05 (1.81) -0.00 (0.73) -0.02 (0.11) 0.89 (6.06)  0.72   1.90
ESPZMB 80-91 0.01 (0.88) 0.01 (0.40) -0.00 (1.11) 0.13 (1.18) 1.04 (4.50)  0.75   2.22
ESPZMT 80-91 0.01 (0.72) 0.02 (0.57) 0.00 (0.22) 0.39 (2.35) 0.90 (6.69)  0.78   1.16
ESPZOG 80-91 -0.00 (0.13) 0.05 (1.11) 0.00 (0.02) 0.32 (4.23) 0.79 (9.96)  0.88   2.15
ESPZOO 80-91 0.02 (0.60) 0.01 (1.18) 0.00 (0.52) 0.13 (0.69) 0.80 (6.32)  0.62   0.91
ESPZOP 80-91 0.01 (2.02) 0.01 (0.38) -0.00 (1.68) -0.05 (0.41) 0.69 (7.48)  0.85   1.55
ESPZOW 80-91 -0.01 (0.67) 0.01 (0.77) -0.00 (0.59) 0.32 (1.48) 0.78 (3.48)  0.73   1.50
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SECTOR SMPL γ0 Tγ0 γ3 Tγ3 γ2 Tγ2 γ1 Tγ1 γ4 Tγ4 R
2
         DW
ITAZ35 74-94 0.02 (2.69) 0.06 (0.93) 0.00 (0.26) 0.11 (0.95) 1.07 (6.56)  0.59   1.83
ITAZ38 81-94 0.02 (2.33) 0.08 (1.64) 0.00 (0.28) 0.29 (1.34) 1.00 (7.14)  0.77   2.32
ITAZLF 74-94 0.03 (4.66) -0.03 (1.20) 0.00 (1.44) 0.45 (2.77) 1.10 (6.82)  0.57   2.34
ITAZLX 81-94 0.01 (0.84) -0.00 (0.20) -0.00 (0.80) 0.17 (0.72) 0.72 (4.15)  0.34   1.70
ITAZMB 74-94 0.01 (1.00) -0.00 (0.06) 0.00 (0.37) 0.05 (1.07) 0.93 (2.69)  0.59   2.92
ITAZMT 74-94 0.02 (3.32) 0.04 (0.58) 0.00 (1.07) 0.44 (2.87) 1.00 (5.68)  0.66   1.87
ITAZOG 74-94 0.02 (2.25) 0.00 (0.38) 0.00 (1.65) -0.02 (0.32) 0.91 (5.46)  0.66   1.68
ITAZOO 74-94 0.02 (2.72) -0.01 (0.69) 0.01 (4.31) 0.06 (2.54) 0.96 (6.65)  0.75   2.22
ITAZOP 74-94 0.01 (2.49) 0.00 (0.09) 0.00 (3.44) -0.07 (1.16) 0.81 (7.64)  0.53   1.82
NLDZ35 81-93 0.01 (2.62) -0.07 (1.21) 0.01 (0.71) 0.08 (1.60) 1.15 (3.58)  0.53   1.82
NLDZ38 81-93 0.01 (1.57) -0.00 (0.14) 0.01 (0.53) 0.67 (4.24) 0.85 (7.48)  0.86   1.51
NLDZLF 74-93 0.01 (1.69) 0.00 (0.08) 0.00 (2.84) -0.10 (1.24) 0.71 (2.91)  0.05   1.60
NLDZLX 74-93 -0.00 (0.22) -0.02 (0.54) -0.00 (1.19) 0.28 (1.62) 0.66 (5.65)  0.73   1.78
NLDZMB 74-93 0.01 (0.95) 0.14 (2.25) 0.00 (3.93) 0.09 (1.71) 0.66 (1.91)  0.54   1.38
NLDZMT 74-93 0.01 (2.22) 0.10 (1.49) -0.00 (1.20) 0.02 (0.13) 0.89 (5.45)  0.56   1.26
NLDZOG 81-93 0.01 (2.32) -0.02 (1.29) -0.01 (0.75) 0.60 (8.57) 0.60 (7.23)  0.96   1.40
NLDZOP 74-93 0.02 (4.29) -0.01 (0.59) 0.00 (0.88) 0.10 (0.69) 1.03 (5.86)  0.72   2.00
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APPENDIX B3
Including constant term
Regression equation identical to appendix B1. Whenever present, structural breaks and significant constant terms are taken into account. All equations are estimated with a
heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. Frest is the value of the Wald-statistic when imposing the coefficient restriction put forward in the main text. prest denotes the corresponding
p-value. All other definitions according to appendix B1 and B2.
SECTOR SMPL γ0 Tγ0 γ3 Tγ3 γ2 Tγ2 γ1 Tγ1 γ4 Tγ4 R
2
       DW    Frest  prest
DEUZ35 74-92 0.02 (3.76) 0.13 (1.82) 0.03 (2.37) 0.12 (0.70) 0.74 (3.40)  0.57  1.74  25.4 0.00
DEUZ38 74-92 0.02 (3.38) 0.02 (0.35) 0.01 (0.83) 0.19 (0.55) 1.02 (8.01)  0.66  1.29  4.7 0.03
DEUZLF 74-92 0.01 (4.80) 0.02 (1.03) 0.00 (0.36) -0.08 (1.55) 1.25 (12.66)  0.84  1.96  346.3 0.00
DEUZLX 74-92 0.02 (3.05) -0.00 (0.41) 0.01 (0.79) -0.15 (0.90) 1.01 (7.59)  0.82  1.25  43.8 0.00
DEUZMB 74-92 0.02 (3.35) -0.04 (0.63) 0.03 (2.18) 0.38 (3.61) 1.06 (3.99)  0.63  2.25  29.1 0.00
DEUZMT 74-93 0.02 (4.55) 0.08 (1.94) 0.01 (1.06) -0.22 (1.04) 1.07 (12.12)  0.78  1.40  31.3 0.00
DEUZOG 74-92 0.02 (3.41) 0.02 (0.71) 0.02 (1.01) 0.04 (0.20) 1.24 (8.17)  0.77  1.81  21.6 0.00
DEUZOO 81-92 0.02 (5.40) 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (1.04) -0.51 (2.77) 0.71 (5.49)  0.87  2.61  71.9 0.00
DEUZOP 74-92 0.02 (3.34) 0.00 (0.17) 0.01 (0.76) 0.14 (0.88) 0.81 (4.04)  0.60  1.52  26.4 0.00
DEUZOW 74-92 0.02 (2.83) 0.00 (0.14) 0.02 (0.90) -0.14 (0.49) 1.29 (11.80)  0.73  2.44  16.4 0.00
FRAZMT 86-91 0.03 (2.10) -0.36 (1.42) 0.01 (1.05) -0.81 (7.27) 1.46 (3.01)  0.92  3.27  254.1 0.00
FRAZOP 74-91 0.02 (8.09) -0.21 (4.10) -0.00 (6.29) 0.18 (2.29) 0.17 (0.90)  0.81  2.29  108.6 0.00
GBRZOP 74-92 0.02 (2.02) 0.10 (1.73) -0.01 (2.04) 0.43 (2.18) 0.77 (3.22)  0.28  1.83  8.8    0.00
USAZLF 74-93 0.01 (2.56) 0.02 (0.62) -0.00 (1.96) -0.11 (1.65) 0.77 (4.42)  0.60  2.16  264.7 0.00
USAZMB 74-93 0.01 (2.01) 0.04 (0.85) -0.00 (1.97) 0.06 (1.79) 1.05 (16.36)  0.92  1.69  707.2 0.00
USAZMT 74-93 0.01 (2.55) 0.04 (0.75) -0.00 (1.37) -0.03 (0.15) 0.94 (12.60)  0.90  2.04  29.9 0.00
USAZOO 74-93 0.01 (2.38) 0.06 (1.39) -0.00 (0.04) -0.05 (0.49) 0.94 (7.38)  0.84  2.00  110.9 0.00
USAZOW 74-93 0.01 (2.11) 0.02 (1.00) -0.00 (1.99) 0.13 (2.05) 0.99 (24.18)  0.98  2.08  185.7 0.00
ESPZ35 80-91 0.02 (3.21) -0.03 (3.10) 0.00 (2.67) 0.16 (3.59) 0.96 (9.00)  0.90  1.31  351.2 0.00
ESPZOP 80-91 0.01 (2.02) 0.01 (0.38) -0.00 (1.68) -0.05 (0.41) 0.69 (7.48)  0.85  1.55  79.9 0.00
ITAZ35 74-94 0.02 (2.69) 0.06 (0.93) 0.00 (0.26) 0.11 (0.95) 1.07 (6.56)  0.59  1.83  63.8 0.00
ITAZ38 81-94 0.02 (2.33) 0.08 (1.64) 0.00 (0.28) 0.29 (1.34) 1.00 (7.14)  0.77  2.32  321.0 0.00
ITAZLF 74-94 0.03 (4.66) -0.03 (1.20) 0.00 (1.44) 0.45 (2.77) 1.10 (6.82)  0.57  2.34  11.2 0.00
ITAZMT 74-94 0.02 (3.32) 0.04 (0.58) 0.00 (1.07) 0.44 (2.87) 1.00 (5.68)  0.66  1.87  13.3 0.00
ITAZOG 74-94 0.02 (2.25) 0.00 (0.38) 0.00 (1.65) -0.02 (0.32) 0.91 (5.46)  0.66  1.68  204.1 0.00
ITAZOP 74-94 0.01 (2.49) 0.00 (0.09) 0.00 (3.44) -0.07 (1.16) 0.81 (7.64)  0.53  1.82  351.4 0.00
NLDZ35 81-93 0.01 (2.62) -0.07 (1.21) 0.01 (0.71) 0.08 (1.60) 1.15 (3.58)  0.53  1.82  198.8 0.00
NLDZMT 74-93 0.01 (2.22) 0.10 (1.49) -0.00 (1.20) 0.02 (0.13) 0.89 (5.45)  0.56  1.26  46.7 0.00
NLDZOG 81-93 0.01 (2.32) -0.02 (1.29) -0.01 (0.75) 0.60 (8.57) 0.60 (7.23)  0.96  1.40  36.2 0.00
NLDZOP 74-93 0.02 (4.29) -0.01 (0.59) 0.00 (0.88) 0.10 (0.69) 1.03 (5.86)  0.72  2.00  35.7 0.00
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Excluding constant term4
Regression equation identical to appendix B1, with γ0 = 0. Whenever present, structural breaks are taken into account. All equations are estimated with a heteroscedasticity-consistent
covariance matrix. All other definitions according to appendix B1 and B2.
SECTOR SMPL γ3 Tγ3 γ2 Tγ2 γ1 Tγ1 γ4 Tγ4 R
2
      
DW      Frest  prest
FRAZ35 80-91 0.13 (1.40) -0.01 (4.22) 0.02 (0.23) 0.60 (2.54)  0.42 2.74   89.9 0.00
FRAZ38 80-91 0.26 (6.44) -0.00 (0.60) -0.52 (2.38) 0.89 (7.11)  0.80 2.33   49.1 0.00
FRAZLF 74-91 0.08 (0.93) 0.00 (1.25) -0.36 (0.74) 0.79 (0.89) -0.17 1.22   7.7  0.01
FRAZLX 74-91 -0.03 (0.74) 0.00 (0.67) -0.22 (1.26) 0.57 (5.98)  0.23 1.49   48.3 0.00
FRAZMB 74-91 0.03 (0.90) 0.00 (1.20) 0.13 (0.75) 0.92 (3.36)  0.26 2.64   24.3 0.00
FRAZOG 74-91 0.13 (1.41) -0.01 (3.33) 0.50 (2.49) 0.38 (1.91)  0.31 1.80   6.5     0.01
FRAZOO 74-91 0.01 (0.81) 0.00 (1.61) 0.04 (0.35) 0.17 (0.47) -0.11 1.76   73.5 0.00
FRAZOW 80-91 0.01 (0.33) -0.00 (1.81) 0.13 (0.77) 0.66 (4.90)  0.68 1.61   26.7 0.00
GBRZ35 86-92 0.44 (4.36) -0.03 (4.99) 0.14 (0.31) -0.89 (1.70)  0.46 2.48   3.7     0.06
GBRZ38 74-92 -0.01 (0.65) -0.00 (0.32) 0.17 (0.81) 0.31 (1.85)  0.06 1.61   16.1 0.00
GBRZLF 74-92 0.01 (0.10) -0.00 (0.41) 0.06 (0.63) -0.24 (0.86) -0.14 2.33   100.8 0.00
GBRZLX 86-92 -0.20 (2.93) -0.02 (38.92) 1.87 (14.68) 0.17 (4.98)  0.99 0.72   44.3 0.00
GBRZMB 74-89 0.19 (1.15) 0.00 (0.61) 0.11 (0.71) 0.31 (1.51) -0.03 1.20   34.3 0.00
GBRZMT 74-92 0.17 (1.54) 0.00 (0.24) 0.24 (1.05) 0.39 (3.29)  0.23 1.48   11.4 0.00
GBRZOG 74-92 0.36 (3.16) 0.00 (0.02) 0.26 (2.41) 0.14 (0.48)  0.51 1.07   48.9 0.00
GBRZOO 74-92 0.09 (1.22) -0.01 (1.50) 0.70 (4.85) -0.06 (0.54)  0.61 1.66   4.5     0.03
GBRZOW 74-92 0.06 (0.86) 0.00 (0.35) 0.19 (1.44) 0.73 (6.44)  0.55 2.20   39.7 0.00
USAZ35 74-93 0.21 (3.59) -0.00 (1.38) 0.04 (0.60) 0.85 (6.03)  0.71 2.10   227.8 0.00
USAZ38 74-93 0.14 (2.23) -0.00 (0.86) -0.21 (1.34) 0.80 (10.63)  0.87 1.28   58.6 0.00
USAZLX 74-93 0.06 (2.35) -0.00 (3.17) -0.10 (1.49) 1.05 (22.96)  0.94 1.42   268.7 0.00
USAZOG 74-93 0.05 (1.80) -0.00 (0.30) -0.07 (0.54) 0.98 (9.70)  0.88 2.28   70.4 0.00
USAZOP 74-93 0.02 (0.53) -0.00 (1.21) 0.10 (0.71) 1.08 (8.58)  0.63 1.54   39.0 0.00
ESPZ38 80-91 -0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.34) 0.07 (0.30) 1.12 (4.70)  0.68 1.65   16.9 0.00
ESPZLF 80-91 0.07 (0.81) -0.00 (4.29) 0.17 (0.53) 0.35 (0.96)  0.10 1.60   6.5     0.01
ESPZLX 80-91 -0.05 (2.03) -0.00 (0.71) -0.02 (0.15) 0.91 (6.05)  0.75 1.89   50.8 0.00
ESPZMB 80-91 0.03 (1.24) -0.00 (1.14) 0.07 (0.89) 0.89 (8.00)  0.74 1.98   139.4 0.00
ESPZMT 80-91 0.05 (1.15) -0.00 (0.41) 0.38 (2.31) 0.86 (5.82)  0.80 1.19   14.6 0.00
ESPZOG 80-91 0.05 (1.76) 0.00 (0.39) 0.32 (4.52) 0.79 (12.48)  0.90 2.16   93.0 0.00
ESPZOO 80-91 0.01 (1.67) 0.00 (0.31) 0.09 (0.55) 0.77 (5.67)  0.63 0.91   29.6 0.00
ESPZOW 80-91 0.00 (0.43) -0.00 (0.32) 0.29 (1.39) 0.83 (3.45)  0.76 1.43   11.1 0.00
ITAZLX 81-94 0.00 (0.55) -0.00 (0.59) 0.03 (0.25) 0.59 (3.22)  0.38 1.72   68.5 0.00
ITAZMB 74-94 0.00 (0.07) 0.00 (0.47) 0.06 (1.41) 0.75 (3.45)  0.57 2.75   514.8 0.00
ITAZOO 74-94 0.00 (0.22) 0.01 (5.64) 0.08 (2.40) 0.75 (6.57)  0.66 1.78   686.3 0.00
NLDZ38 81-93 0.00 (0.13) 0.01 (0.80) 0.72 (3.16) 0.76 (8.50)  0.83 1.26   1.4     0.23
NLDZLF 74-93 0.01 (0.56) 0.00 (1.27) -0.10 (1.00) 0.26 (1.57) -0.11 1.46   123.4 0.00
NLDZLX 74-93 -0.02 (0.53) -0.00 (1.17) 0.28 (1.63) 0.68 (7.84)  0.74 1.78   18.3 0.00
NLDZMB 74-93 0.15 (2.42) 0.00 (3.41) 0.09 (1.76) 0.55 (1.83)  0.54 1.21   332.7 0.00
                    
4 .  The Durbin-Watson statistic can, in the absence of a constant term in the regression equation, only be regarded as a crude indication of the presence of (first-order) serial
correlation. Tests based on a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) approach gave identical results though.
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APPENDIX B4
Granger causality tests
Regression equation is:
where i = sector subscript,
j = country subscript,
 p,q = predetermined lag orders (p,q = 1..3),
ε = random disturbance term.
First it is tested whether labour growth Granger causes wage growth (FLW, with corresponding p-value pLW), whereafter the reverse situation is tested (denoted by FWL, with corresponding
p-value pWL).
SECTOR SMPL FLW pLW FWL pWL
USAZ35 74-94 1.67 0.22 1.12 0.38
DEUZ35 74-94 1.20 0.35 3.04 0.07
GBRZ35 74-94 0.49 0.70 5.89 0.01
NLDZ35 74-94 1.01 0.42 0.19 0.90
ESPZ35 74-94 0.84 0.56 0.34 0.80
ITAZ35 74-94 0.56 0.65 1.33 0.30
USAZ38 74-94 0.65 0.60 0.63 0.61
GBRZ38 74-94 6.33 0.01 2.98 0.07
NLDZ38 74-94 2.09 0.15 0.64 0.60
ESPZ38 74-94 0.27 0.85 0.63 0.64
ITAZ38 74-94 0.51 0.68 3.07 0.06
USAZLF 74-94 0.43 0.73 0.32 0.81
DEUZLF 74-94 1.26 0.33 0.16 0.92
GBRZLF 74-94 4.73 0.02 0.42 0.74
NLDZLF 74-94 1.32 0.31 0.66 0.59
ESPZLF 74-94 1.36 0.40 0.33 0.81
ITAZLF 74-94 0.59 0.63 1.06 0.40
USAZLX 74-94 1.70 0.22 0.57 0.64
FRAZLX 74-94 0.40 0.76 0.92 0.46
DEUZLX 74-94 2.02 0.16 0.99 0.43
GBRZLX 74-94 0.59 0.64 8.04 0.00
NLDZLX 74-94 1.08 0.39 0.04 0.99
ESPZLX 74-94 4.19 0.13 10.2 0.04
ITAZLX 74-94 0.40 0.75 0.80 0.51
USAZMB 74-94 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.60
FRAZMB 74-94 1.19 0.36 1.22 0.35
DEUZMB 74-94 0.67 0.59 0.26 0.85
GBRZMB 74-94 0.17 0.92 3.75 0.05
NLDZMB 74-94 0.94 0.45 2.48 0.11
ESPZMB 74-94 0.68 0.62 0.42 0.75
ITAZMB 74-94 1.15 0.36 2.66 0.09
USAZMT 74-94 0.90 0.47 0.85 0.49
GBRZMT 74-94 4.29 0.03 7.87 0.00
NLDZMT 74-94 2.49 0.11 0.40 0.76
ITAZMT 74-94 0.76 0.54 3.21 0.06
USAZOG 74-94 0.54 0.67 1.05 0.41
DEUZOG 74-94 0.38 0.77 0.40 0.75
NLDZOG 74-94 0.67 0.59 0.21 0.89
ESPZOG 74-94 0.80 0.57 2.34 0.25
ITAZOG 74-94 0.32 0.81 0.50 0.69
,+X+Y+ = Y ijtq-tij,qijqijp-tij,pijpij0ijijt εβαδ ∑∑
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SECTOR SMPL FLW pLW FWL pWL
USAZOO 74-94 0.46 0.72 1.26 0.33
FRAZOO 74-94 0.95 0.45 0.78 0.53
DEUZOO 74-94 0.64 0.60 2.38 0.12
GBRZOO 74-94 0.41 0.75 1.89 0.18
NLDZOO 74-94 0.99 0.43 1.50 0.26
ESPZOO 74-94 2.26 0.26 0.63 0.64
USAZOP 74-94 1.66 0.22 1.12 0.38
FRAZOP 74-94 2.85 0.09 3.37 0.06
DEUZOP 74-94 0.51 0.68 0.29 0.83
GBRZOP 74-94 1.96 0.17 3.07 0.07
NLDZOP 74-94 3.09 0.06 0.62 0.61
ESPZOP 74-94 6.77 0.08 7.88 0.06
ITAZOP 74-94 1.11 0.38 5.75 0.01
USAZOW 74-94 1.47 0.27 1.59 0.24
DEUZOW 74-94 3.37 0.05 7.88 0.00
GBRZOW 74-94 0.26 0.85 1.19 0.35
NLDZOW 74-94 1.57 0.25 1.30 0.32
ESPZOW 74-94 0.33 0.81 0.43 0.75
ITAZOW 74-94 1.35 0.30 0.52 0.68
FRAZ35 74-94 2.55 0.11 0.97 0.44
FRAZ38 74-94 1.45 0.28 0.77 0.53
DEUZ38 74-94 0.69 0.57 0.78 0.53
FRAZLF 74-94 0.02 1.00 2.19 0.15
FRAZMT 74-94 1.62 0.24 0.15 0.93
DEUZMT 74-94 3.11 0.06 2.54 0.10
ESPZMT 74-94 0.57 0.66 0.77 0.57
FRAZOG 74-94 0.29 0.83 0.24 0.86
ITAZOO 74-94 0.29 0.83 0.22 0.88
GBRZOG 74-94 0.73 0.55 2.43 0.12
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Wage growth determines labour growth - final regressions
Regression equation is:
where, i = sector;
j = country;
w,p,r,A,L are defined cf. the basic perfect competition model;
η = random disturbance term.
Including constant term
SECTOR SMPL δ0 Tδ0 δ3 Tδ3 γ2 Tδ2 δ1 Tδ1 δ4 Tδ4  R
2
       DW
GBRZ35 74-92 -0.03 (3.02) 0.17 (1.61) -0.00 (0.17) -0.04 (0.27) 0.29 (1.36)   0.21   1.76
GBRZMB 74-89 -0.09 (4.32) -0.51 (2.39) -0.00 (0.80) -0.11 (0.96) 0.34 (1.54)   0.01   1.97
Excluding constant term
Regression equation same as above, with δ0 = 0.
SECTOR SMPL δ3 Tδ3 γ2 Tδ2 δ1 Tδ1 δ4 Tδ4  R
2
     DW
ESPZLX 80-91 0.04 (1.77) -0.00 (0.23) 0.06 (0.41) 0.91 (6.28)  0.73 1.45
GBRZLX 74-92 0.31 (3.24) -0.00 (0.26) -0.16 (1.10) 0.53 (3.34)  0.21 2.08
ITAZOP 74-94 -0.00 (0.34) -0.00 (1.49) 0.16 (3.05) 0.56 (3.20)  0.49 1.26
,+w+A+r+p+ = L ijtijt4ijijt3ijjt2ijijt1ij0ijijt ηδδδδδ
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APPENDIX B5
Basic regressions/Testing for structural breaks
Regression equation is:
where, i = sector subscript;
j = country subscript;
w,Meu,Mneu,r,A,L are defined cf. the imperfect competition model;
ψ = random disturbance term.
All definitions cf. appendix B1. If an entry cannot be calculated, it is denoted by ***.
SECTOR SMPL e0 Te0 e3 Te3 e2 Te2 e1a Te1a e1b Te1b e4   Te4  R
2
 DW  F81   p81    F85   p85
DEUZ35 74-92 0.01 (2.74) 0.08 (1.05) 0.02 (1.48) 0.05 (0.65) 0.04 (0.40) 0.79   (4.83)   0.65 1.66  1.2  0.42    0.7  0.67
DEUZ38 74-92 0.02 (2.66) 0.03 (0.42) 0.01 (0.58) 0.01 (0.16) 0.05 (0.69) 0.96   (8.41)   0.64 1.54  2.1  0.18    1.0  0.51
DEUZLF 74-92 0.01 (1.42) 0.04 (1.60) 0.00 (0.56) 0.13 (1.79) -0.00 (0.14) 1.14   (10.81)   0.87 1.85  0.5  0.79    0.9  0.56
DEUZLX 74-92 0.01 (1.44) 0.00 (0.03) 0.01 (0.82) 0.05 (0.51) 0.06 (1.03) 0.87   (8.34)   0.84 1.54  2.3  0.14    1.1  0.47
DEUZMB 74-92 0.01 (2.41) -0.02 (0.36) 0.02 (1.26) 0.07 (0.56) 0.03 (0.32) 1.11   (3.16)   0.52 2.66  0.7  0.64    0.3  0.93
DEUZMT 74-92 0.01 (2.08) 0.08 (1.54) 0.00 (0.41) -0.08 (0.74) 0.17 (1.69) 0.92   (7.25)   0.79 1.47  3.4  0.07    2.4  0.14
DEUZOG 74-92 0.01 (0.83) 0.03 (1.45) 0.01 (0.89) 0.24 (2.48) -0.01 (0.53) 0.87   (4.96)   0.84 2.31  0.6  0.70    1.3  0.38
DEUZOO 74-92 0.03 (1.95) -0.00 (1.57) -0.01 (0.26) 0.12 (1.06) -0.01 (0.27) 0.88   (3.51)   0.59 2.01  3.7  0.06    0.3  0.94
DEUZOP 74-92 0.01 (2.27) -0.00 (0.03) 0.02 (1.07) 0.37 (4.06) -0.22 (3.02) 0.60   (3.62)   0.78 1.99  2.8  0.10    1.5  0.30
DEUZOW 74-92 0.01 (1.58) 0.00 (0.13) 0.00 (0.45) -0.02 (0.22) 0.13 (1.80) 0.99   (8.54)   0.85 2.62  2.1  0.18    1.6  0.26
FRAZ35 74-91 0.01 (1.50) -0.19 (1.52) 0.00 (3.14) 0.11 (1.83) 0.11 (2.33) 0.74   (1.75)   0.70 1.61  ***  ***     0.5  0.79
FRAZ38 74-91 0.01 (0.94) 0.06 (0.26) 0.00 (1.10) 0.04 (0.42) 0.08 (0.97) 1.24   (4.77)   0.53 1.05  ***  ***     0.7  0.64
FRAZLF 74-91 0.01 (0.57) 0.02 (0.21) 0.00 (0.41) 0.20 (1.17) -0.05 (0.71) -0.36   (0.41)  -0.22 0.77  ***  ***     0.3  0.89
FRAZLX 74-91 0.03 (1.22) 0.02 (0.32) 0.00 (0.59) -0.04 (0.39) 0.02 (0.26) 1.24   (2.33)   0.17 1.23  ***  ***     0.2  0.98
FRAZMB 74-91 -0.01 (0.26) 0.07 (1.21) 0.00 (0.58) -0.03 (0.29) 0.03 (0.44) 0.78   (0.81)   0.12 2.75  ***  ***     1.6  0.28
FRAZMT 74-91 0.01 (1.66) 0.02 (0.14) 0.00 (2.67) -0.06 (0.67) 0.19 (3.64) 1.08   (5.29)   0.75 1.35  ***  ***     1.1  0.45
FRAZOG 74-91 0.00 (0.37) -0.05 (0.50) -0.00 (0.21) 0.26 (1.51) -0.03 (0.30) 0.63   (2.47)   0.53 2.53  ***  ***     1.0  0.48
FRAZOO 74-91 0.00 (0.12) 0.01 (0.48) 0.00 (1.52) -0.09 (0.49) 0.04 (0.46) 0.32   (0.32)  -0.26 1.95  ***  ***     1.6  0.28
FRAZOP 74-91 0.02 (5.68) -0.16 (3.96) -0.00 (2.01) -0.05 (1.54) 0.12 (2.77) -0.01   (0.02)   0.86 2.53  ***  ***     0.6  0.72
FRAZOW 74-91 0.01 (0.51) 0.01 (0.38) 0.01 (1.26) -0.20 (1.02) 0.13 (1.91) 0.51   (2.02)   0.22 1.68  ***  ***     0.2  0.98
GBRZ35 74-92 0.01 (0.94) 0.16 (0.70) 0.00 (0.00) -0.01 (0.14) -0.02 (0.37) 0.51   (2.59)   0.07 2.25  1.2  0.39    3.8  0.05
GBRZ38 74-92 -0.01 (0.58) -0.01 (0.51) 0.00 (0.76) 0.12 (1.38) 0.02 (0.26) 0.29   (1.12)   0.10 1.93  2.8  0.10    1.8  0.22
GBRZLF 74-92 0.00 (0.03) 0.05 (0.26) -0.00 (0.24) 0.13 (1.92) -0.04 (0.41) -0.22   (0.56)  -0.15 2.45  4.0  0.04    1.8  0.24
GBRZLX 74-92 0.03 (1.79) 0.30 (1.43) 0.00 (0.78) -0.06 (0.56) 0.22 (3.56) 0.67   (3.27)   0.53 2.21  6.8  0.01    7.8  0.01
GBRZMB 74-89 0.03 (0.44) 0.49 (1.11) 0.01 (1.31) 0.08 (0.76) -0.06 (0.36) 0.37   (0.94)  -0.20 1.28  3.2  0.14    ***  ***
GBRZMT 74-92 0.01 (0.45) 0.02 (0.08) 0.00 (0.58) 0.11 (0.93) -0.01 (0.10) 0.57   (2.47)   0.21 1.87  2.1  0.18    3.9  0.05
GBRZOG 74-92 0.02 (1.49) 0.52 (3.15) 0.00 (1.04) -0.03 (0.54) 0.03 (4.11) 0.12   (0.56)   0.63 1.99  0.6  0.73    2.5  0.13
GBRZOO 74-92 0.01 (0.45) -0.12 (0.43) 0.00 (0.08) 0.05 (0.43) 0.11 (0.71) -0.19   (1.39)  -0.25 1.83  0.6  0.73    0.3  0.92
GBRZOP 74-92 0.02 (1.32) 0.09 (1.36) -0.00 (0.77) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00) 0.44   (1.62)   0.03 1.54  1.3  0.35    0.8  0.57
GBRZOW 74-92 -0.00 (0.27) 0.04 (0.53) 0.00 (0.19) 0.13 (1.02) -0.08 (0.96) 0.72   (3.99)   0.46 2.27  1.0  0.48    1.1  0.47
USAZ35 74-92 0.01 (1.41) 0.10 (0.83) -0.00 (0.41) 0.05 (0.93) -0.02 (0.67) 0.68   (3.87)   0.73 1.76  ***  ***     0.7  0.67
USAZ38 74-92 0.00 (0.37) 0.10 (0.87) -0.00 (0.18) -0.01 (0.33) 0.05 (0.53) 0.80   (4.65)   0.90 1.73  ***  ***     0.8  0.60
USAZLF 74-92 0.01 (1.99) 0.01 (0.19) -0.00 (2.00) 0.01 (0.30) 0.03 (0.92) 0.78   (2.66)   0.45 2.13  ***  ***     0.6  0.73
USAZLX 74-92 0.01 (2.33) 0.06 (1.81) -0.00 (2.43) 0.00 (0.17) -0.04 (1.38) 1.19  (14.55)   0.95 1.35  ***  ***     1.3  0.36
USAZMB 74-92 0.01 (0.91) 0.04 (0.58) -0.00 (0.46) 0.01 (0.69) 0.02 (0.82) 1.00  (10.11)   0.91 1.38  ***  ***     3.9  0.05
,+Le+Ae+re+Me+Me+e = w ijtijt4ijijt3ijjt2ijneuijt1bijeuijt1aij0ijijt ψ
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SECTOR SMPL e0 Te0 e3 Te3 e2 Te2 e1a Te1a e1b Te1b e4   Te4  R
2
 DW  F81   p81    F85   p85
USAZMT 74-92 0.01 (1.46) 0.09 (1.08) -0.00 (1.28) -0.01 (0.28) -0.01 (0.11) 0.97   (5.74)   0.90 2.04  ***  ***     1.7  0.25
USAZOG 74-92 0.00 (0.28) 0.02 (0.58) -0.00 (0.24) -0.06 (1.42) 0.09 (1.61) 0.92   (5.41)   0.89 2.97  ***  ***     0.3  0.90
USAZOO 74-92 0.01 (0.99) 0.05 (1.47) -0.00 (0.15) 0.00 (0.08) 0.01 (0.22) 0.90   (6.12)   0.81 1.95  ***  ***     0.4  0.84
USAZOP 74-92 0.01 (1.67) -0.02 (0.63) -0.00 (1.83) 0.00 (0.03) -0.01 (0.20) 1.05   (4.25)   0.67 2.15  ***  ***     0.7  0.63
USAZOW 74-92 -0.00 (0.20) 0.04 (1.82) -0.00 (1.94) 0.02 (1.25) 0.06 (3.16) 0.86  (11.93)   0.98 2.24  ***  ***     0.9  0.56
ESPZ35 80-91 0.00 (0.46) 0.07 (1.28) 0.00 (0.21) -0.06 (0.62) 0.05 (1.69) 0.96   (6.22)   0.79 2.31  ***  ***     ***   ***
ESPZ38 80-91 0.00 (0.12) 0.07 (2.31) -0.00 (4.39) -0.44 (4.39) 0.30 (3.44) 0.94   (9.27)   0.89 1.21  ***  ***     ***   ***
ESPZLF 80-91 0.01 (1.60) 0.05 (1.39) -0.00 (7.08) -0.07 (1.32) -0.22 (5.84) 0.25   (1.33)   0.80 2.74  ***  ***     ***   ***
ESPZLX 80-91 0.01 (0.58) -0.04 (1.27) -0.00 (0.65) -0.07 (1.06) -0.02 (0.17) 0.99   (4.41)   0.72 1.98  ***  ***     ***   ***
ESPZMB 80-91 0.01 (0.78) 0.02 (0.77) -0.00 (0.96) -0.05 (0.59) 0.06 (0.91) 1.00   (4.28)   0.72 2.26  ***  ***     ***   ***
ESPZMT 80-92 -0.01 (0.67) 0.13 (1.68) -0.00 (2.32) -0.15 (2.03) 0.16 (1.94) 0.90   (6.94)   0.73 1.95  ***  ***     ***   ***
ESPZOG 80-91 -0.01 (0.70) 0.09 (0.96) -0.00 (0.32) -0.14 (1.46) 0.15 (1.59) 0.64   (3.13)   0.83 1.87  ***  ***     ***   ***
ESPZOO 80-91 -0.00 (0.10) 0.02 (1.46) 0.00 (0.03) -0.17 (1.54) 0.11 (0.85) 0.62   (3.10)   0.67 1.07  ***  ***     ***   ***
ESPZOP 80-91 0.02 (1.51) -0.00 (0.07) -0.00 (1.43) -0.07 (0.80) 0.08 (1.35) 0.74   (6.94)   0.84 2.06  ***  ***     ***   ***
ESPZOW 80-91 -0.01 (0.52) -0.00 (0.09) 0.00 (1.03) 0.02 (0.13) 0.18 (1.06) 0.80   (3.89)   0.70 0.70  ***  ***     ***   ***
ITAZ35 74-92 0.01 (1.72) 0.04 (0.58) 0.00 (0.33) 0.08 (0.78) -0.04 (0.58) 1.03   (4.99)   0.51 1.59  4.7  0.03    0.8   0.62
ITAZ38 74-92 0.03 (3.37) -0.19 (2.03) 0.00 (1.21) -0.06 (0.45) 0.10 (1.25) 0.97   (6.25)   0.74 2.06  5.4  0.02    0.3   0.91
ITAZLF 74-92 0.02 (2.47) -0.02 (0.46) -0.00 (0.48) 0.07 (1.46) -0.00 (0.04) 0.82   (4.35)   0.38 2.24  1.1  0.46    0.7   0.66
ITAZLX 74-92 -0.00 (0.15) 0.00 (0.53) 0.00 (1.35) -0.07 (0.66) 0.13 (1.68) 0.54   (1.84)   0.35 2.27  3.1  0.08    0.1   0.99
ITAZMB 74-92 0.00 (0.21) 0.05 (1.76) -0.01 (1.54) 0.19 (2.29) -0.10 (1.64) 0.63   (1.85)   0.73 2.59  0.7  0.67    0.5   0.78
ITAZMT 74-92 0.02 (2.40) -0.06 (0.83) 0.00 (0.27) -0.05 (0.32) 0.10 (0.90) 1.01   (3.93)   0.60 1.93  1.3  0.36    0.2   0.98
ITAZOG 74-92 0.01 (2.45) -0.01 (0.79) 0.00 (1.04) 0.03 (0.36) 0.06 (0.93) 0.88   (5.22)   0.76 1.63  1.2  0.40    1.4   0.32
ITAZOO 74-92 0.02 (2.29) -0.01 (0.83) 0.01 (3.89) -0.10 (1.28) 0.08 (0.95) 0.99   (6.81)   0.71 1.86  1.3  0.36    0.8   0.57
ITAZOP 74-92 0.01 (2.00) -0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (1.98) 0.02 (0.18) -0.02 (0.35) 0.77   (5.97)   0.44 1.77  0.9  0.53    0.4   0.88
NLDZ35 74-92 0.01 (2.54) 0.05 (0.55) -0.00 (0.34) 0.07 (1.28) -0.02 (0.63) 0.88   (4.67)   0.37 1.39  1.9  0.22    1.3   0.36
NLDZ38 74-92 0.02 (3.23) 0.05 (1.28) -0.00 (3.38) -0.08 (0.97) -0.06 (1.63) 1.11   (7.48)   0.69 1.44  1.6  0.27    0.7   0.69
NLDZLF 74-92 0.01 (0.58) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.59) 0.08 (0.91) -0.06 (1.32) 0.44   (1.14)   0.07 2.14  0.9  0.54    1.3   0.38
NLDZLX 74-92 -0.01 (0.58) -0.02 (0.47) -0.00 (0.41) 0.12 (0.99) 0.07 (0.95) 0.68   (7.00)   0.72 1.57  0.2  0.96    2.9   0.10
NLDZMB 74-92 0.00 (0.09) 0.18 (4.10) 0.00 (4.55) 0.06 (1.61) 0.05 (1.26) 0.17   (0.66)   0.65 1.51  10.9 0.00    0.5   0.77
NLDZMT 74-92 0.01 (3.20) 0.06 (1.03) -0.00 (0.84) 0.11 (0.81) -0.10 (1.50) 0.77   (4.09)   0.55 1.17  2.0  0.19    0.9   0.57
NLDZOG 74-92 0.01 (2.04) -0.02 (0.48) -0.00 (0.81) 0.09 (0.92) -0.00 (0.04) 0.98   (8.26)   0.73 1.55  0.6  0.73    7.4   0.01
NLDZOP 74-92 0.02 (3.35) -0.00 (0.24) 0.00 (0.91) -0.02 (0.20) -0.00 (0.02) 1.03   (4.69)   0.64 1.91  1.8  0.24    1.8   0.23
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APPENDIX B6
Taking structural breaks into account
Labour growth determines wage growth
Regression equation identical to appendix B1. All other definitions according to appendix B1 and B5.
SECTOR SMPL e0 Te0 e3 Te3 e2 Te2 e1a Te1a e1b Te1b e4    Te4  R
2
 DW  
DEUZ35 74-92 0.01 (2.74) 0.08 (1.05) 0.02 (1.48) 0.05 (0.65) 0.04 (0.40) 0.79   (4.83)   0.65  1.66
DEUZ38 74-92 0.02 (2.66) 0.03 (0.42) 0.01 (0.58) 0.01 (0.16) 0.05 (0.69) 0.96   (8.41)   0.64  1.54
DEUZLF 74-92 0.01 (1.42) 0.04 (1.60) 0.00 (0.56) 0.13 (1.79) -0.00 (0.14) 1.14  (10.81)   0.87  1.85
DEUZLX 74-92 0.01 (1.44) 0.00 (0.03) 0.01 (0.82) 0.05 (0.51) 0.06 (1.03) 0.87   (8.34)   0.84  1.54
DEUZMB 74-92 0.01 (2.41) -0.02 (0.36) 0.02 (1.26) 0.07 (0.56) 0.03 (0.32) 1.11   (3.16)   0.52  2.66
DEUZMT 74-92 0.01 (2.08) 0.08 (1.54) 0.00 (0.41) -0.08 (0.74) 0.17 (1.69) 0.92   (7.25)   0.79  1.47
DEUZOG 74-92 0.01 (0.83) 0.03 (1.45) 0.01 (0.89) 0.24 (2.48) -0.01 (0.53) 0.87   (4.96)   0.84  2.31
DEUZOO 74-92 0.03 (1.95) -0.00 (1.57) -0.01 (0.26) 0.12 (1.06) -0.01 (0.27) 0.88   (3.51)   0.59  2.01
DEUZOP 74-92 0.01 (2.27) -0.00 (0.03) 0.02 (1.07) 0.37 (4.06) -0.22 (3.02) 0.60   (3.62)   0.78  1.99
DEUZOW 74-92 0.01 (1.58) 0.00 (0.13) 0.00 (0.45) -0.02 (0.22) 0.13 (1.80) 0.99   (8.54)   0.85  2.62
FRAZ35 74-91 0.01 (1.50) -0.19 (1.52) 0.00 (3.14) 0.11 (1.83) 0.11 (2.33) 0.74   (1.75)   0.70  1.61
FRAZ38 74-91 0.01 (0.94) 0.06 (0.26) 0.00 (1.10) 0.04 (0.42) 0.08 (0.97) 1.24   (4.77)   0.53  1.05
FRAZLF 74-91 0.01 (0.57) 0.02 (0.21) 0.00 (0.41) 0.20 (1.17) -0.05 (0.71) -0.36   (0.41)  -0.22  0.77
FRAZLX 74-91 0.03 (1.22) 0.02 (0.32) 0.00 (0.59) -0.04 (0.39) 0.02 (0.26) 1.24   (2.33)   0.17  1.23
FRAZMB 74-91 -0.01 (0.26) 0.07 (1.21) 0.00 (0.58) -0.03 (0.29) 0.03 (0.44) 0.78   (0.81)   0.12  2.75
FRAZMT 74-91 0.01 (1.66) 0.02 (0.14) 0.00 (2.67) -0.06 (0.67) 0.19 (3.64) 1.08   (5.29)   0.75  1.35
FRAZOG 74-91 0.00 (0.37) -0.05 (0.50) -0.00 (0.21) 0.26 (1.51) -0.03 (0.30) 0.63   (2.47)   0.53  2.53
FRAZOO 74-91 0.00 (0.12) 0.01 (0.48) 0.00 (1.52) -0.09 (0.49) 0.04 (0.46) 0.32   (0.32)  -0.26  1.95
FRAZOP 74-91 0.02 (5.68) -0.16 (3.96) -0.00 (2.01) -0.05 (1.54) 0.12 (2.77) -0.01   (0.02)   0.86  2.53
FRAZOW 74-91 0.01 (0.51) 0.01 (0.38) 0.01 (1.26) -0.20 (1.02) 0.13 (1.91) 0.51   (2.02)   0.22  1.68
GBRZ35 86-92 0.02 (0.72) 0.18 (0.56) -0.03 (4.69) 0.27 (0.63) -0.15 (1.06) -1.26   (1.01)   0.38  1.83
GBRZ38 74-92 -0.01 (0.58) -0.01 (0.51) 0.00 (0.76) 0.12 (1.38) 0.02 (0.26) 0.29   (1.12)   0.10  1.93
GBRZLF 81-92 0.02 (0.90) 0.16 (0.49) -0.02 (4.61) 0.67 (2.72) -0.11 (1.05) 0.83   (1.51)   0.49  1.95
GBRZLX 86-92 0.10 (37.75) 1.92 (57.95) -0.02 (74.48) -0.12 (6.16) 0.21 (27.83) 0.19   (7.47)   1.00  1.31
GBRZMB 74-89 0.03 (0.44) 0.49 (1.11) 0.01 (1.31) 0.08 (0.76) -0.06 (0.36) 0.37   (0.94)  -0.20  1.28
GBRZMT 86-92 -0.01 (2.30) -0.97 (7.71) 0.00 (1.53) 0.58 (10.59) 0.32 (3.56) 0.08   (0.67)   0.99  3.24
GBRZOG 74-92 0.02 (1.49) 0.52 (3.15) 0.00 (1.04) -0.03 (0.54) 0.03 (4.11) 0.12   (0.56)   0.63  1.99
GBRZOO 74-92 0.01 (0.45) -0.12 (0.43) 0.00 (0.08) 0.05 (0.43) 0.11 (0.71) -0.19   (1.39)  -0.25  1.83
GBRZOP 74-92 0.02 (1.32) 0.09 (1.36) -0.00 (0.77) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00) 0.44   (1.62)   0.03  1.54
GBRZOW 74-92 -0.00 (0.27) 0.04 (0.53) 0.00 (0.19) 0.13 (1.02) -0.08 (0.96) 0.72   (3.99)   0.46  2.27
USAZ35 74-92 0.01 (1.41) 0.10 (0.83) -0.00 (0.41) 0.05 (0.93) -0.02 (0.67) 0.68   (3.87)   0.73  1.76
USAZ38 74-92 0.00 (0.37) 0.10 (0.87) -0.00 (0.18) -0.01 (0.33) 0.05 (0.53) 0.80   (4.65)   0.90  1.73
USAZLF 74-92 0.01 (1.99) 0.01 (0.19) -0.00 (2.00) 0.01 (0.30) 0.03 (0.92) 0.78   (2.66)   0.45  2.13
USAZLX 74-92 0.01 (2.33) 0.06 (1.81) -0.00 (2.43) 0.00 (0.17) -0.04 (1.38) 1.19  (14.55)   0.95  1.35
USAZMB 86-92 -0.01 (1.07) -0.17 (3.46) -0.12 (1.69) 0.17 (1.64) -0.16 (1.31) 1.01   (2.67)   0.93  3.01
USAZMT 74-92 0.01 (1.46) 0.09 (1.08) -0.00 (1.28) -0.01 (0.28) -0.01 (0.11) 0.97   (5.74)   0.90  2.04
USAZOG 74-92 0.00 (0.28) 0.02 (0.58) -0.00 (0.24) -0.06 (1.42) 0.09 (1.61) 0.92   (5.41)   0.89  2.97
USAZOO 74-92 0.01 (0.99) 0.05 (1.47) -0.00 (0.15) 0.00 (0.08) 0.01 (0.22) 0.90   (6.12)   0.81  1.95
USAZOP 74-92 0.01 (1.67) -0.02 (0.63) -0.00 (1.83) 0.00 (0.03) -0.01 (0.20) 1.05   (4.25)   0.67  2.15
USAZOW 74-92 -0.00 (0.20) 0.04 (1.82) -0.00 (1.94) 0.02 (1.25) 0.06 (3.16) 0.86  (11.93)   0.98  2.24
ESPZ35 80-91 0.00 (0.46) 0.07 (1.28) 0.00 (0.21) -0.06 (0.62) 0.05 (1.69) 0.96   (6.22)   0.79  2.31
ESPZ38 80-91 0.00 (0.12) 0.07 (2.31) -0.00 (4.39) -0.44 (4.39) 0.30 (3.44) 0.94   (9.27)   0.89  1.21
ESPZLF 80-91 0.01 (1.60) 0.05 (1.39) -0.00 (7.08) -0.07 (1.32) -0.22 (5.84) 0.25   (1.33)   0.80  2.74
ESPZLX 80-91 0.01 (0.58) -0.04 (1.27) -0.00 (0.65) -0.07 (1.06) -0.02 (0.17) 0.99   (4.41)   0.72  1.98
ESPZMB 80-91 0.01 (0.78) 0.02 (0.77) -0.00 (0.96) -0.05 (0.59) 0.06 (0.91) 1.00   (4.28)   0.72  2.26
ESPZMT 80-92 -0.01 (0.67) 0.13 (1.68) -0.00 (2.32) -0.15 (2.03) 0.16 (1.94) 0.90   (6.94)   0.73  1.95
ESPZOG 80-91 -0.01 (0.70) 0.09 (0.96) -0.00 (0.32) -0.14 (1.46) 0.15 (1.59) 0.64   (3.13)   0.83  1.87
ESPZOO 80-91 -0.00 (0.10) 0.02 (1.46) 0.00 (0.03) -0.17 (1.54) 0.11 (0.85) 0.62   (3.10)   0.67  1.07
56
SECTOR SMPL e0 Te0 e3 Te3 e2 Te2 e1a Te1a e1b Te1b e4   Te4  R
2
 DW  
ESPZOP 80-91 0.02 (1.51) -0.00 (0.07) -0.00 (1.43) -0.07 (0.80) 0.08 (1.35) 0.74   (6.94)   0.84  2.06
ESPZOW 80-91 -0.01 (0.52) -0.00 (0.09) 0.00 (1.03) 0.02 (0.13) 0.18 (1.06) 0.80   (3.89)   0.70  0.70
ITAZ35 81-92 0.02 (2.57) -0.01 (0.17) 0.01 (1.09) 0.09 (0.75) -0.01 (0.10) 0.92   (3.35)   0.70  1.89
ITAZ38 81-92 0.02 (2.86) -0.12 (1.66) -0.00 (0.91) -0.05 (0.64) 0.13 (2.29) 0.96   (6.18)   0.83  3.68
ITAZLF 74-92 0.02 (2.47) -0.02 (0.46) -0.00 (0.48) 0.07 (1.46) -0.00 (0.04) 0.82   (4.35)   0.38  2.24
ITAZLX 74-92 -0.00 (0.15) 0.00 (0.53) 0.00 (1.35) -0.07 (0.66) 0.13 (1.68) 0.54   (1.84)   0.35  2.27
ITAZMB 74-92 0.00 (0.21) 0.05 (1.76) -0.01 (1.54) 0.19 (2.29) -0.10 (1.64) 0.63   (1.85)   0.73  2.59
ITAZMT 74-92 0.02 (2.40) -0.06 (0.83) 0.00 (0.27) -0.05 (0.32) 0.10 (0.90) 1.01   (3.93)   0.60  1.93
ITAZOG 74-92 0.01 (2.45) -0.01 (0.79) 0.00 (1.04) 0.03 (0.36) 0.06 (0.93) 0.88   (5.22)   0.76  1.63
ITAZOO 74-92 0.02 (2.29) -0.01 (0.83) 0.01 (3.89) -0.10 (1.28) 0.08 (0.95) 0.99   (6.81)   0.71  1.86
ITAZOP 74-92 0.01 (2.00) -0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (1.98) 0.02 (0.18) -0.02 (0.35) 0.77   (5.97)   0.44  1.77
NLDZ35 74-92 0.01 (2.54) 0.05 (0.55) -0.00 (0.34) 0.07 (1.28) -0.02 (0.63) 0.88   (4.67)   0.37  1.39
NLDZ38 74-92 0.02 (3.23) 0.05 (1.28) -0.00 (3.38) -0.08 (0.97) -0.06 (1.63) 1.11   (7.48)   0.69  1.44
NLDZLF 74-92 0.01 (0.58) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.59) 0.08 (0.91) -0.06 (1.32) 0.44   (1.14)   0.07  2.14
NLDZLX 74-92 -0.01 (0.58) -0.02 (0.47) -0.00 (0.41) 0.12 (0.99) 0.07 (0.95) 0.68   (7.00)   0.72  1.57
NLDZMB 81-92 -0.01 (3.24) 0.17 (12.03) 0.01 (1.61) 0.06 (4.35) -0.02 (1.40) -0.10   (1.00)   0.85  2.24
NLDZMT 74-92 0.01 (3.20) 0.06 (1.03) -0.00 (0.84) 0.11 (0.81) -0.10 (1.50) 0.77   (4.09)   0.55  1.17
NLDZMT 86-92 0.03 (3.11) 0.13 (1.34) 0.06 (1.73) -0.26 (0.89) 0.03 (0.24) -0.22   (0.31)   0.66  2.60
NLDZOP 74-92 0.02 (3.35) -0.00 (0.24) 0.00 (0.91) -0.02 (0.20) -0.00 (0.02) 1.03   (4.69)   0.64  1.91
Wage growth determines labour growth - final regressions
Regression equation is:
where, i = sector;
j = country;
w,Meu,Mneu,r,A,L are defined cf. the imperfect competition model;
pi = random disturbance term.
SECTOR SMPL e0 Te0 e3 Te3 e2 Te2 e1a Te1a e1b Te1b e4    Te4  R
2
  DW
ESPZLX 80-91 -0.03 (1.44) -0.03 (1.44) -0.03 (1.44) -0.03 (1.44) -0.03 (1.44) -0.03   (1.44)   0.87   2.09
GBRZ35 74-92 -0.03 (2.87) -0.03 (2.87) -0.03 (2.87) -0.03 (2.87) -0.03 (2.87) -0.03   (2.87)   0.42   1.81
GBRZLX 86-92 -0.53 (11.51) -0.53 (11.51) -0.53 (11.51) -0.53 (11.51) -0.53 (11.51) -0.53   (11.51)   1.00   1.25
GBRZMB 74-89 -0.09 (3.28) -0.09 (3.28) -0.09 (3.28) -0.09 (3.28) -0.09 (3.28) -0.09   (3.28)   0.34   2.17
SECTOR SMPL e0 Te0 e3 Te3 e2 Te2 e1a Te1a e1b Te1b e4    Te4  R
2
  DW
ITAZOP 81-92 -0.01 (2.91) -0.01 (2.91) -0.01 (2.91) -0.01 (2.91) -0.01 (2.91) -0.01   (2.91)   0.82   1.62
,+wg+Ag+rg+Mg+Mg+g = L ijtijt4ijijt3ijijt2ijneuijt1bijeuijt1aij0ijijt pi
